Modeling the effect of the use of fiber reinforced plastics on the evacuation of a ro-pax passenger deck by Rodriguez Panagiotopoulos, Andres
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MODELING THE EFFECT OF THE 
USE OF FIBER REINFORECED 
PLASTICS ON THE 
EVACUATION OF A RO-PAX 
PASSENGER DECK 
 
 
Andrés Rodríguez Panagiotopoulos 
 
 
Department of Fire Safety Engineering  
Lund University, Sweden 
 
Report 5453, Lund 2014 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
HOST UNIVERSITY: Lund University  
FACULTY:  LTH 
DEPARTMENT: Fire safety and risk analysis 
Academic Year 2013-2014 
 
 
 MODELING THE EFFECT OF THE USE OF FIBER REINFORECED PLASTICS ON THE 
EVACUATION OF A RO-PAX PASSENGER DECK. 
 
 
Andrés Eduardo Rodríguez Panagiotopoulos 
 
Promoters: 
 Patrick van Hees (Lund Universty) 
 Dan Lauridsen (DBI) 
 
Master thesis submitted in the Erasmus Mundus Study Programme  
International Master of Science in Fire Safety Engineering 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
MODELING THE EFFECT OF THE USE OF FIBER REINFORECED PLASTICS ON THE EVACUATION 
OF A RO-PAX PASSENGER DECK  
Andrés Rodríguez Panagiotopoulos 
Report 5453 
ISSN: 1402-3504 
ISRN: LUTVDG/TVBB—5453--SE 
Number of pages: 93 
Keywords 
Fire safety, Fiber reinforced plastics, ship, FDS EVAC, evacuation 
 
Abstract: 
Modern ship design and construction is striving to make sea transportation more fuel efficient and 
more environmentally friendly.  One of the possible solutions is to make the ships lighter by reducing 
the weight of the superstructure, constructing it completely or partially with lightweight materials 
such as Fiber Reinforced Plastics (FRP), like glass fiber composites or carbon 
fiber composites. However, the use of these materials would have an impact on the acceptance 
criteria for safe evacuation in case of fire, mainly due to the differences on the thermal, chemical and 
physical properties that have a direct effect on the smoke production and fire development. The 
evacuation module of FDS is used to couple the fire development with its influence on the evacuation 
process in 12 fire scenarios, including four design fires and three material set-ups. The unprotected 
FRP set-up proved to be the most critical one, hence passive fire protection must be provided. 
Performance-based design can be applied for ship evacuation, however, with close support of 
literature and prescriptive IMO codes. Implementing FDS EVAC simplifies the coupling of fire 
development with the evacuation process, allowing the user to model this interaction in an easier 
way. 
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Summary/Abstract 
Modern ship design and construction is striving to make sea transportation more fuel efficient and 
more environmentally friendly.  One of the possible solutions is to make the ships lighter by reducing 
the weight of the superstructure, constructing it completely or partially with lightweight materials 
such as Fiber Reinforced Plastics (FRP), like glass fiber composites or carbon 
fiber composites. However, the use of these materials would have an impact on the acceptance 
criteria for safe evacuation in case of fire, mainly due to the differences on the thermal, chemical and 
physical properties that have a direct effect on the smoke production and fire development. The 
evacuation module of FDS is used to couple the fire development with its influence on the evacuation 
process in 12 fire scenarios, including four design fires and three material set-ups. The unprotected 
FRP set-up proved to be the most critical one, hence passive fire protection must be provided. 
Performance-based design can be applied for ship evacuation, however, with close support of 
literature and prescriptive IMO codes. Implementing FDS EVAC simplifies the coupling of fire 
development with the evacuation process, allowing the user to model this interaction in an easier 
way. 
 
 
 
 
Resumen 
El diseño y construcción de barcos está actualmente esforzándose para hacer el transporte más 
eficiente en términos de combustible y más amigable con el ambiente. Una de las posibles soluciones 
es hacer los barcos más ligero a través de la reducción del peso de la superestructura, construyéndola 
parcial o totaltmente con materiales ligeros Plásticos Reforzados con Fibras (FRP por sus siglas en 
inglés), como por ejemplo compuestos de fibra de vidrio o de carbon. Sin embargo, el uso de estos 
materiales tendría un efecto en los criterios de aceptación para tener un proceso de evacuación 
seguro en caso de incendio, básicamente debido a las diferencias en las propiedades térmicas, 
químicas y físicas, las cuales tienen consecuencias directas en la producción de humo y en el desarrollo 
del fuego. El módulo de evacuación de FDS es utilizado para acoplar el desarrollo del fuego y su 
influencia en el proceso de evacuación en 12 escenarios que incluyen cuatro fuegos-desiño y tres 
combinaciones de materiales. La combinación en la que el FRP no está protegido, resultó ser la más 
crítica, por ende, protección pasiva debe ser instalada. El diseño basado en desempeño puede ser 
aplicado en el caso de evacuación en barcos, no obstante, con apoyo cercano de literatura y de códigos 
preceptivos de la IMO. La implementación de FDS EVAC simplifica el acoplamiento del desarrollo del 
incendio con el proceso de evacuación, permitiendo al usuario modelar esta interacción más 
fácilmente. 
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1. INTRODUCTION & OBJECTIVES 
 
Fire safety has been gained more and more importance due to the big impact that a fire 
accident has on people, therefore the fire regulation field has become an active sector 
creating more thoroughly rules and demanding higher standard. However, these regulations 
can indeed limit the design and the materials used in a project just because they are not 
covered in the law.  
Nowadays, with an industry sector that is moving towards greener technologies and 
processes, the effective use of the energy sources is one of the main focuses of scientific 
investigations. The transportation segment is one of the main developers of new technologies 
in this field due to the higher demand of these services. 
Modern ship design and construction is striving to make sea transportation more fuel efficient 
and more environmentally friendly.  One of the possible solutions is to make the ships lighter 
reducing the weight of the superstructure, constructing it completely or partially with 
lightweight materials such as aluminum or Fiber Reinforced Plastics (FRP) for example glass 
fiber or carbon fiber composites. 
However, the use of these materials will have an impact on the acceptance criteria for safe 
evacuation in case of fire onboard the ship. Differences in the thermal, chemical and physical 
properties have an impact on the smoke production and fire development. These changes 
could make the ship not safe in terms of fire, unless extra safety measures are taken. Reason 
why several studies have been done in order to provide solutions that are economically 
feasible with a significant weight reduction and, more importantly, that comply with the 
SOLAS regulations, including fire safety. Within these investigations, an important number of 
them are related to the field of FRPs, typically used in load-bearing elements and lightweight 
materials used as wall linings. A list of some of these studies that cover structural, chemical 
and fire reaction of the FRPs, is shown in the following section. 
1.1  Background 
 
One of the first studies by Adrian Coman is a structural feasibility study has been done to 
compare the use of steel or FRPs in the superstructure of a ship [1]. The main objective of this 
investigation was to design the superstructure of the Ro-Ro ship Tor Magnolia, using 
composite materials, specifically, fiber reinforced plastics. This work was motivated by the 
interest of making the ship lighter and thus, making it more fuel-efficient and more 
environmentally friendly. However, the fire safety issue was not considered, since it was 
outside of the scope of the mentioned dissertation.The S-LÄSS Error! Reference source not 
found. is a network that aims for the development of new lightweight constructions at sea, 
especially aluminum, carbon and glass fibers that have an accepted safety level. S-LÄSS 
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gathers important information from various sources about the Swedish industrial 
development of lightweight constructions at sea. 
 
The BEEST Project [2], a European initiative which goal was to increase the competitiveness 
of European ships by diminishing the life cycle cost, drastically reducing environmental impact 
and improving safety. The solutions include the implementation of lightweight materials in 
ships. Another related investigation is SAFEDOR [3], another European initiative that focuses 
on providing risk-based regulation that can lead to solutions to further increase the safety of 
water-borne transports that use lightweight materials. 
 
Also, in 2009, fire safety engineering begins to be used as a tool to design composites for ships 
building. An example of this, is a paper included in the 11th International Conference and 
Exhibition of Fire and Materials organized by Gutierrez et al. [17]. This study was aimed to 
develop a methodology that complies with the SOLAS and IMO regulations for alternative 
design, validating numerical tools comparing them with results gotten from experiments. The 
safety of the passenger and the ship is studied by performing evacuation and thermo-
mechanical simulations to afterwards, propose risk-control measurements to improve the 
safety for example, installing air curtains and water film system.  
 
An effort to couple fire and evacuation simulations is being done, as an example is the work 
of Azzi et al [24] where a link between FDS (fire tool) and EVI (evacuation) is done. In the 
project the IMO standards are followed and the Fractional Effective Dose (FED) is taken into 
account to evaluate the evacuation performance. The design fire is taken from the real scale 
cabin fire experiments done by SP [9]. Azzi et al concluded that the fire effects on the people 
must be taken into account during the evacuation process to have more realistic and, 
therefore, safer designs; the investigators also concluded that crew assistance is crucial 
throughout the evacuation. 
 
Based on the number of investigations and projects that can be found about the use of 
lightweight materials on ships, it is clear that further investigation on these materials is of 
great importance for the ship industry. Moreover, little tests have been done on the effect of 
FRPs on evacuation using coupled fire-evacuation simulations, reason why this project 
becomes important as to give a start research on this subject.  
  
1.2 Objectives 
 
The aims of the project is to determine the influence of the FRPs on the fire safety, however, 
it’s limited to study the evacuation process and the fire behavior. 
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1.2.1 General objective 
 
1. Investigate the performance-based design method to determine the fire safety 
level of the 7th deck of the DFDS owned Ro-Pax ship Victoria Seaways for three 
different material set-ups of one passenger deck, with focus on fire and evacuation 
modelling. 
 
1.2.2 Specific objectives 
 
1. Assess the viability of applying performance-based methodology for ship 
safety and check the prescriptive guidelines for using software tools. 
2. Determine the design fires relevant for the 7th deck of the Victoria Seaways 
and the input to them. 
3. Determine the influence of the selected design fire on the evacuation process 
and the fire behavior. 
4. Determine the influence of the material set-up on the evacuation process and 
the fire behavior. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
 
Traditionally, ships like ferries are designed according to prescriptive design codes (SOLAS) 
[4]. For safe evacuation SOLAS defines a minimum geometry width depending on the number 
of passengers. The safety level in relation to the evacuation is therefore quantified as “above 
minimum”. In this thesis a comparison will be made between the construction materials on 
how safe they are or not using performance-based design, using the guidelines proposed by 
SFPE [7]. 
The assessment is made on both prescriptive and alternative designs using the same 
performance criteria for evaluating all the cases. The calculations are made using FDS 6.0.1 
and FDS EVAC 2.5.0 to determine if the evacuees have enough time to abandon the deck 
safely.  
The safety assessment takes into account mainly the FED, however, with the purpose of 
comparing with the methodologies proposed by  Gutiérrez et al [17] and Azzi et al. [24], the 
following variables are considered for one example case as well: Smoke layer height, radiation 
to the floor, smoke layer temperature, fire propagation and visibility. If a zone and/or material 
are considered as critical, improving solutions are proposed. 
The geometry was built based on blue prints given by the manufacturer. Then a mesh 
sensitivity analysis will be made in order to find the optimal size of the mesh’s elements for 
the main simulations of the investigation. Four design fires are taken into account to evaluate 
the performance of the three material set-ups. 
2.1 Software selection 
 
From the many available CFD and evacuation simulation software, FDS is selected as the tool 
to be used in this project due to the fact that FDS has been tested already on its capacity to 
model the fire behavior of FRPs onboard a ship [9], [21] Another argument is the free 
availability of the software, motivated its choice. Furthermore, FDS (v 6.0.1) comes with an 
evacuation module called FDS EVAC (v 2.5.0), which has been verified using the cases 
proposed by IMO for verification of evacuation simulation tools. According to the developers 
of FDS EVAC, the software successfully passed all IMO’s tests [19], making the program just 
ideal for the case in hand: Evacuation in a Ro-Pax ship. 
The IMO tests for verification of evacuation software include component test and a series of 
functional, qualitative and quantitative verification tests. There eleven in total and go from 
elementary scenarios such as an agent maintaining a specified walking speed, to case where 
the exit choice of the evacuees is checked with informed expectations. However, this is not 
to be considered a validation of the model but just a verification that it can be used to study 
ship evacuation. 
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The validation of FDS EVAC has been already done by the developers, who compared FED 
EVAC’s results with the ones of other evacuation software (SIMULEX and EXODUS) and 
experimental data of pedestrian traffic flow study done by Daamen [8]. The results of the 
validation are that FDS EVAC can reasonably reproduce the experimental data and other 
model’s results. More information can be found in Chapter 6 of the User’s Guide [19]. 
 
2.2 Geometry 
 
The geometry used in this study has been adapted from the plans of the 7th passenger deck 
of DFDS’ ship Victoria seaways, taking only into consideration the relevant geometry and 
dimensions. This deck is constructed in FDS and shown in Figure 1, where the walls are shown 
in white with a black outline and in blue; the floor and the ceiling are present but were set to 
be invisible for the sake of a better visualization of the results of the simulations. 
 
Figure 1 Geometry of the deck in Smokeview® showing the 4 exits of the deck 
 
In the previous figure, the walls and holes in blue color are only taken into account for the 
evacuation calculations, whereas the rest of the walls are taken for both fire and evacuation 
simulations. The blue walls represent mainly the passenger cabins and the inner divisions 
that, because of their location, do not affect the development of the fire nor the movement 
of the smoke. In Figure 1, the location of the evacuation doors is marked with a green 
rectangle and a green cone. These openings aren’t considered by FDS when calculating the 
fire behavior. 
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2.3 Evacuation simulations 
 
The evacuation simulations are done using the evacuation calculation module of FDS: FDS 
EVAC. This software makes the coupled calculation of the fire behavior and the evacuation 
process, taking into account the effects of the smoke on the evacuees. The simulations use as 
input data for walking speed, pre-movement times and the population distribution the values 
proposed by IMO in its guidelines [5]. IMO requires that 50 evacuation simulations are done 
to account for uncertainty, the results of these simulations are treated and analyzed 
according to guidance given by the IMO. 
This regulation requires that for the evacuation of the whole ship, the following relation 
should be fulfilled: 
 
1,25 ∙  + 	 ∙ 
 +  ≤                                                        (1) 
and                                                     +  ≤ 30                                                                
(2) 
 
Where T is the travel time, E is the embarkation time, L is the launching time and ‘n’ is consider 
60 min for Ro-Ro ships. 
 
However, since this project consists on the analysis of only one of the passenger decks, the 
above criterion given by equations (1) and (2) cannot be used since it is only valid if the 
evacuation of the whole ship. 
 
According the blueprints of the ship, the deck has a capacity of 73 people of which 22 are 
passengers and 51 are crew. The IMO guidelines propose the population distribution that 
should be used when performing the evacuation simulation. Table 1  shows the population’s 
composition suggested by IMO and the subsequent simplification that is done to input the 
data in FDS EVAC. 
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Table 1 Population’s composition 
Population 
group-
passengers [5] 
Percentage of 
passengers (%) 
[5] 
Person class to 
be introduced 
in FDS EVAC 
Number of 
passenger 
within each 
class 
Avatar color in 
FDS EVAC 
Females 
younger than 
30 years 
7 Children 2 Blue 
Females 30-50 
years 
7  
Adult Females 
 
5 
 
Black 
Females older 
than 50 years 
16 
Females older 
than 50 years, 
mobility 
impaired (1) 
10  
 
 
 
Elderly 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
Yellow Females older 
than 50 years, 
mobility 
impaired (2) 
10 
Males younger 
than 30 years 
7 Children 2 Blue 
Males 30-50 
years 
7  
Adult males 
5 Green 
Males older 
than 50 years 
16 
Males older 
than 50 years, 
mobility 
impaired (1) 
10  
 
 
Elderly 
 
 
4 
 
 
Yellow 
Males older 
than 50 years, 
mobility 
impaired (2) 
10 
Population 
group-crew [5] 
Percentage of 
crew (%) [5] 
Person class to 
be introduced 
in FDS EVAC 
Number of 
passenger 
within each 
class 
Assigned color 
in FDS EVAC 
Crew female 50 Modified 
female 
26 Sepia 
Crew male 50 Modified male 25 Sepia 
 
 
An important factor when evacuation simulations are done, is the pre-movement time of the 
evacuees. For this, IMO makes the difference between the response time at day and the time 
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at night; in this project only the day case is studied. The following equation is the time 
distribution used to model the pre-evacuation time of the passengers. 
 = 1,00808√2 0,72   −

 
 − 4,562
2 ∗ 0,94 % 
 
Where, ‘y’ represents the probability density at response time ‘x’. 
To introduce this distribution in FDS EVAC four values are required: minimum, maximum, 
mean and standard deviation. The following table summarizes these values. 
Table 2 Pre-movement time input values [5] 
Case Minimum [s] Maximum [s] Mean value [s] Standard deviation [s] 
Day 0 300 4,562 0,94 
 
 
Subsequently, once all the 600 evacuation simulation are carried out, these are compared 
with a base case, modeled as an evacuation drill in FDS EVAC, disregarding the fire data. Then, 
the effect of the location of the fire and the material set-up can be assessed by a comparison 
using the evacuation time, maximum FED value and average fatalities. In the cases where 
fatalities occur, the evacuation time is taken as the time when the last alive evacuee leaves 
the deck. 
2.4 Design fires. Size and location 
 
Fire 1, Fire 2 and Fire 3 
The first three design fires are equal in size (HRR) and growth to the fire measured 
experimentally by SP [9] where an exact replica of a passenger cabin was set to fire and its 
development was recorded. This fire is located in three different cabins within the ship’s 7th 
deck; the locations, shown in red in the following figures, were selected according to its 
proximity to the means of evacuation, therefore, challenging the evacuation design of the 
deck and are shown in Figure 3, Figure 4 and Figure 5.  
However, to perform the mesh sensitivity study, the fire will be limited to 1000 s as seen in 
Figure 2, the decay phase won’t be considered. People are supposed to evacuate during the 
initial stages of the fire and, after the fire goes beyond its maximum HRR, the effect on the 
composite material won’t be as large as on the growth and flashover phases. These 
assumptions are checked and confirmed in the 3. Results’ section. The following figures show 
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the actual HRR curve and the simplification, because of the noise present in the experimental 
curve, of the cabin fire in order to introduce it as an input in FDS to calculate the fire behavior. 
An important note is that the cabin door is assumed to be open and the suppression systems 
are to be not operational, making these combinations extreme scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 2 Actual (above) and simplified (below) Cabin fire [9] 
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As stated above, the design fire shown in Figure 2 is put in three different cabins within the 
deck. The first location, shown in red on Figure 3, is chosen due to its proximity to one of the 
staircases used as a mean of evacuation in the deck. To differentiate it from the other cases, 
in this scenario the window of the cabin is assumed to be open during the whole simulation, 
this opening provides with more oxygen to the fire in the initial phases delaying the under-
ventilated conditions that occur in the other three cases. 
 
 
Figure 3 Location of fire 1 
The location of fire 2 is thought to have an effect on two cabin corridors almost at the same 
time while also filling with smoke the area leading to one staircase and to the helipad in the 
exterior of the deck, shown in leftmost part of Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4 Location of fire 2 
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The location of fire 3 is thought to be the most challenging to the evacuation design. Being at 
this position, it easily fills with smoke the staircase located to its front and the smoke spreads 
to the corridor leading the leftmost staircase, thus, two exits will be filled with smoke at the 
beginning stages of the evacuation.  
 
Figure 5 Location of fire 3 
 
Fire 4 
In this case, a fire starts in the converter room due to a short circuit. As a consequence of the 
large quantity of cables coated with PVC, the fire develops quickly. A t-squared fire is assumed 
with a fast growing rate [13]. Two data cables and one medium voltage cable are assumed to 
be involved in the fire; and average of each peak HRRPUA [12] is taken to calculate peak heat 
release rate of the fire. 
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Figure 6 Cable fire in converter room 
 
The location of this fire endangers the staff that is in charge of steering and navigating the 
ship inside the wheelhouse, while also filling with smoke the corridor leading to one of the 
main staircases.  
 
Figure 7 Location of fire 4 
 
2.5 Material set-ups 
 
In this project, three material combinations are used. In the first one steel is used, this is the 
original construction of the ship. The second one consists of a composite sandwich layout 
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without passive fire-protection and the last one involves the same composite sandwich 
arrangement but, this time with passive fire-protection layer. 
The original set-up consists of a sandwich set up with plaster board on each side of a steel 
core. The boards have thickness of 12,5 mm, whereas the steel core has a thickness of 100 
mm. 
The composite sandwich is made of Divinycell® H80 as core material and fiber glass as the 
external layer with a polyvinyl-ester as resin polymer. No thermal protection is provided for 
this configuration. Each layer of fiber glass has 2 mm of thickness and the core has 50 mm. 
Since the PVEST resin used is ignitable, the unprotected walls are considered to be ignitable 
when they reach 397 °C [16] and to follow the HRRPUA curve shown in Figure 8. This figure 
shows the HRRPUA of a glass fiber-PVEST laminate once it reaches its ignition temperature. 
The experimental curve was taken using a radiation of 50 kW/m2 to ignite the composite, this 
condition is not added to the combustion model of the laminate. This issue it is discussed later 
on in section 4.1. 
 
Figure 8 HRRPUA of the laminate [16] 
  
The third set-up takes the same sandwich of the previous configuration but with an extra layer 
of 10cm of thermal protection on each side of the sandwich.  The insulation material used as 
a passive fire protection is Fire Master ®, whose properties are shown in Table 3. 
The relevant properties of all the materials used in the simulations are grouped in the 
following table: 
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Table 3 Material properties 
MATERIAL Density 
(Kg/m3) 
Conductivity 
(W/m*K) 
Specific heat 
capacity (kJ/kg*K) 
Thickness 
(mm) 
Divinycell H80 80 [14] 0,031 [14] 1,92 [15] 50 [12] 
Glass fiber 
laminate [15] 
1870  0,047  0,89  2  
Insulation [15] 100 0,08 0,80 100  
Steel [23] 7850 45,8 0,46 100  
Plaster board [23] 1440 0,48 0,84 12,5 
 
2.6 Performance criteria  
 
In this project, four criteria are studied to assess the safety of the passenger deck; FED being 
the principal one as it gives the chance to measure to some extent, the interaction of the 
people with the fire while evacuating.  Nevertheless, for one example case the other three 
criteria are evaluated as well, thus having a better picture of the evacuation process during 
the fire, being this one of the advantages of applying performance-based design in fire safety 
[7].  
 
2.6.1 FED (Fractional Effective Dose) 
 
This value is measured taking Purser’s definition of FED (Fractional Effective Dose) [10], shown 
in equation (3). Even though an FED value lower than 1,0 is consider as non-lethal, the limit 
of the FED for safe evacuation is taken as 0,3 as suggested in ISO/TS 13571 [20]. This 
document takes into account the variability among humans to withstand the toxic effects as 
there are people more sensitive and others more resistant. 
One of the limitations of FDS EVAC is that it takes only the narcotic effects of CO, CO2 and O2 
to calculate the FED as follows [19]: 
&'()( =  &'*+ × -.*+/ + &'+/                                                     
3 
As noted at the beginning of the Methodology, FDS EVAC does not take into account the 
influence of HCN or HCL in the FED and, furthermore, only takes the hyperventilation effect 
of the CO2 that increases the breathing rate and therefore the quantity of inhaled gases. This 
is further explained in the User’s guide in chapter 2 [19]. 
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2.6.2 Visibility      
 
The measurements of this quantity have a big deal of uncertainty. The main values, used to 
quantify visibility, are derived from a study made by B.F. Clarke, which is summarized in the 
SFPE Handbook [10]. The experiment used the psychological state of individuals moving in 
smoke with increasing extinction coefficient, as a measurement of the minimum visibility 
needed to escape safely. Despite a big range of values for visibility (from 1,2 m to 20 m) the 
selected value for this performance criterion will be the one derived from the data of the 
above-mentioned experiment. For this case the chosen value for this criterion is 10m. 
Visibility is assessed 2m above the floor level. 
2.6.3 Radiation 
 
Certain values of heat may lead to incapacitation. According to D.A. Purser, exposures to a 
flux of 2,5 kW/m2, equivalent to a smoke layer temperature of 200 ℃, can be tolerated by a 
person for no more than five minutes. Greater values can be bared for only few seconds. 
These values can be found in the table 2.6-19 of the SFPE Handbook [10]. For the purpose of 
this project, the tenability limit for heat flux exposure is a value less than 2,5 kW/m2 at floor 
level.  
2.6.4 Smoke layer temperature and height 
 
The smoke layer temperature is related to the amount of permitted radiation to the floor (2,5 
kW/m2). This amount limits the temperature of the smoke layer to approximately 200°C. The 
height that the smoke layer will be allowed to descend should not be less that 2 m above the 
floor; however, this value might be increased due to the limiting factor of the radiation. Thus, 
the radiation will dictate the temperature and the height above ground that the smoke is 
allowed to descend [11].  
 
2.7 Mesh sensitivity analysis 
 
An important part of ensuring the error of the results generated by the simulations is 
acceptable, is proving that they are independent of the mesh being used. The FDS’ developers 
provide guidance on how to estimate the size of the mesh to be used based on the magnitude 
of the fire and the ambient conditions. This is measured by the non-dimensional expression 
D*/δx, where D* is the characteristic fire diameter (given below) and δx is the size of a mesh 
cell, this ratio has been validated in the range of 4 to 16 [18]: 
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'∗ = 1 23456785√9:
/<
                                                                (3) 
 
The bigger the ratio D*/δx is, the finer the mesh is. Table 4 summarizes the relevant values of 
the meshes used for the 4 fires.  
Table 4 Mesh cell size and number of cells 
 
Due to the fact that the design fires have almost the same peak HRR, the selected mesh cell 
sizes are the same for all the fires and just varies depending on the ratio D*/δx. 
The mesh independency is evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively by measuring 
temperature, smoke layer height and temperature and radiation in 5 points of the ship shown 
in white in Figure 9. These points remain unmoved for all the simulations regardless of the 
fire location. 
  D*/δx = 4 D*/δx = 8 D*/δx = 10 D*/δx = 12 
Fire 1 Cell size (cm) 30 15 12 10 
Number of 
cells 
196944 1246560 2402460 4207140 
Fire 2 Cell size (cm) 30 15 12 10 
Number of 
cells 
198624 1260000 2429460 4252500 
Fire 3 Cell size (cm) 30 15 12 10 
Number of 
cells 
198960 1255968 2428710 4233390 
Fire 4 Cell size (cm) 30 15 12 10 
Number of 
cells 
196944 1246560 2402460 4207140 
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Figure 9 Measuring points for mesh sensitivity (in green) 
The optimal mesh cell size will be the coarser one that starts the trend of not affecting the 
simulation’s results, for the measured variables. 
2.8 Input data FDS and FDS EVAC 
 
In order to carry out the simulations, FDS and FDS EVAC require certain data, that due to their 
effect on the final result, must be well supported and the selection has to be motivated. The 
simulations with unprotected FRP walls have two fuels that will be involved in the fire. 
However, these do not start burning at the same time; the FRP combustion is conditioned to 
start when its surface temperature reaches 397 °C [16]. This circumstance makes the selection 
of the heat of combustion, soot yield and CO yield not trivial since FDS only allows one 
reaction line for these cases. The approach to this issue is to take a weighted average between 
the properties of the materials involved in the fire.  The proportion is taken as 60% of the 
laminate (Glass fiber and polyvinylester) with a soot yield of 0,076 g/g [10] and a heat of 
combustion of 22 kJ/g [10]  and 40% of Polyurethane foam with a soot yield of 0,23 g/g [13] 
and a heat of combustion of 17 kJ/g [13]; this results in an average soot yield of 0,14 and a 
heat of combustion of 20 kJ/g.  The carbon monoxide yield of polyurethane is used and it has 
been estimated to be 0,031 g/g [10] 
 
Fire number 4 is a cable fire in the converter room as shown in Figure 7. The HRR curve is built 
averaging the data from three different types of cables gotten from Grayson et al. [12]. Two 
data cables and one medium voltage kind of cables are involved, all of them with PVC cover 
which is taken as the dominant combustible. The peak average HRRPUA is 417 kW/m2 and an 
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ultra-fast growth coefficient of 0,19 kW/s2 [13] is used. The duration of the developed phase 
of the fire is assumed to last 3 minutes. 
 
One case of fire number 4 includes unprotected FRP walls, which is combustible as well. In 
this case the same approach of weighted average is taken with the same proportions used for 
fire 1 to 3. The soot yield of PVC is 0,17 g/g [10] and has a heat of combustion of 16 kJ/g [10] 
which combined with the ones of Polyvinylester (0,076 g/g and 22kJ/g [10]) result in a soot 
yield of 0,11 g/g and a heat of combustion of 19,6 kJ/g. 
 
On the other hand, the evacuation section of the simulations requires data related to human 
behavior in order to get the agents to act as realistically as possible. Despite the control that 
FDS EVAC has over the human behavior variables, some modifications were done to some of 
them to comply with the IMO guidelines when software is used to estimate the evacuation 
time.  
The pre-evacuation time, walking speed of the crew and the density of smoke at which any 
agent will detect the fire, are modified and added to the FDS input files. The values of the first 
two are given by IMO and explained in section 2.3 of this document; the latter has a value of 
0,65 g/m3, a value that according to Gann, “At this mass density of smoke, people 10 m away 
would begin to have difficulty seeing a reflecting exit” [22]. Hence, this value will be taken as 
enough for evacuees in FDS EVAC to realize there is a fire somewhere in the deck and prevent 
them to stand waiting in thick smoke for the assigned pre-movement time to be reached. 
 
An example of the FDS input file used for the simulations can be found in APPENDIX A. 
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3. RESULTS 
 
This section comprises the results of the mesh sensitivity study, the evacuation simulations 
with the different material configurations and design fires, and the example case. Firstly, the 
results of the mesh sensitivity are presented followed by the principal simulations of the 
project, finalizing with the example case taking into account all the performance criteria 
mentioned in section 2.6. It is important to bear in mind that in the cases where fatalities 
occur, the evacuation time is taken as the time when the last alive evacuee leaves the deck. 
 
3.1 Mesh sensitivity 
 
In order to estimate the optimal element size for the fire calculations, four meshes were built 
according to the guidelines in the FDS’ user guide [18]. The meshes, as seen in Table 4, were 
tested with the same scenario, namely case fire number 2 with the steel walls. The curves for 
the mesh resolution D/dx=12 (in red) are incomplete due to several issues with the Restart 
function in the Linux cluster where the simulations were done. 
In Figure 10 the HRR curves generated by each mesh are plotted as a function of the time and 
compared with the simplification of the experimental curve specified by SP [9], shown in 
black. As expected, the higher the resolution, the closer the results are to the experimental 
curve and less different the curves are between them. The figure also depicts an increasing 
difference in relation to the experimental data from 200 s onwards. Despite that, the 
difference between using 10 or 12 as mesh resolution is not considerable. 
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Figure 10 HRR curves for all the mesh resolutions 
 
The following figure shows the gas temperatures as a function of the time for the measuring 
point 3 for the different mesh resolutions. The higher the mesh resolution is, the lower the 
differences between the curves are. 
The data of D/dx=4 and D/dx=8 show appreciable differences between them, with a 
maximum of 36%. Whereas the curves corresponding to D/dx=10 and D/dx=12, present no 
big differences with a maximum of 10% in an otherwise good match. 
The remaining graphs of the gas temperatures have a similar behavior as shown in Appendix 
B. The mesh resolution of 10 is the most efficient one giving almost the same results as using 
a resolution of 12 and noticeably better results than using the other lower resolutions. 
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Figure 11 gas temperatures at point 3 for all the meshes 
Radiation to the floor is the next variable to be analyzed, since is one of the performance 
criteria used to evaluate the scenarios. 
The following figure shows radiation to the floor in time for measuring point 3 with different 
mesh resolutions. This quantity was measured in FDS as Incident Heat Flux since it’s the 
relevant quantity for the specified performance criterion of radiation to the floor. 
The higher the mesh resolution is, the lower the differences between the curves are. 
The data of D/dx=4 and D/dx=8 show appreciable differences between them with a maximum 
of 25%. Whereas the curves corresponding to D/dx=10 and D/dx=12, present no big 
differences with a maximum of 2% in an otherwise good match. 
The remaining graphs of the radiation to the floor have a similar behavior as shown in 
Appendix B. The mesh resolution of 10 is the most efficient one giving almost the same results 
as using a resolution of 12 and noticeably better results than using the other lower 
resolutions. 
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Figure 12 Radiation to the floor at point 3 for all the meshes 
 
3.2 Effect relative to the design fire 
 
The results of the effect of changing the design fires for each material set-up are presented. 
Each one is analyzed focusing on the influence that it has on the evacuation process of the 
passenger deck. The evacuation time, average fatalities and average maximum FED are 
compared with a base case modelled as a fire drill in FDS EVAC, which are calculated to be 
393 [s] (taken as the RSET), no fatalities and zero FED, respectively. 
Even though fatalities are understood to be a whole number, decimals are shown in order to 
have a display that in at least one evacuation simulation fatalities occurred, thus having a 
better comparison between the cases. 
The quantity of Average Fatalities per simulation, is a measurement of how many evacuees 
died, in average, in each of the 50 evacuation simulations done for the correspondent 
scenario. A similar approach is taken for the Average Maximum FED, for each of the 50 
simulations, the maximum FED among the evacuees that are still alive is taken for the 
calculations. If there is at least one agent that dies, the maximum FED for the run is taken as 
1,0. 
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3.2.1 Original set-up (steel) 
 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the studied variable when the steel set-up is used. This case 
has no combustible walls. 
Table 5 Results relative to the original steel set-up 
Design fire Evacuation time [s] Average fatalities 
per simulation 
Average maximum 
FED 
1 578 0 0,17 
2 586 0,06 0,39 
3 591 0,08 0,48 
4 505 1,30 0,90 
 
In the values of Table 5 it can be observed that the maximum evacuation time is for the design 
fire 3 being more than 50% larger that the drill time. Whereas for the fatalities and the 
maximum FED, fire number 4 has the largest values despite having the lowest evacuation 
time.  
Studying the average max FED, the only case in which it is lower than the 0,3 (taken as the 
threshold for safe evacuation) is for fire 1; all the other cases present a value higher than the 
safety limit, being fire 4 the one presenting the highest values. 
An average maximum FED value of 0,9 for fire 4, suggests that there is at least 1 fatality in 
almost all the evacuation simulations, as shown in APPENDIX C and with an average of 
fatalities per simulation of 1,3 it is clear that the most critical case for the steel set-up is design 
fire number 4. 
3.2.2 Unprotected composite set-up 
 
Referring to the set-up that is expected to be the most critical due to the presence of 
combustible fiber-glass walls, Table 6 summarizes the results of the studied variable when the 
unprotected composite set-up is used.  
 
Table 6 Results relative to the unprotected FRP set-up 
Design fire Evacuation time [s] Average fatalities 
per simulation 
Average maximum 
FED 
1 465 0,40 0,46 
2 459 0,46 0,61 
3 462 1,26 0,89 
4 249 4,48 1,00 
 
 39 
 
In the values of Table 6 it can be observed that the maximum evacuation time is for the design 
fire 1, being more than 18% larger than the drill time. Whereas for the fatalities and the 
Maximum FED, fire number 4 has the largest values despite having the lowest evacuation 
time. 
Studying the average max FED, none of the cases has a value lower than the 0,3. Furthermore, 
fire 4 again gives the highest value when compared to the other design fires. 
An average maximum FED value of 1,00 for fire 4, means that there is at least 1 fatality in all 
the evacuation simulations, as shown in APPENDIX C and APPENDIX D, and with an average 
of fatalities per simulation of 4,48 it is clear that the most critical case for the unprotected 
composite set-up is design fire number 4. This means so far that design fire 4 is the most 
critical for two material configurations. 
 
3.2.3 Protected composite set-up 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results of the evacuation process when the protected composite set-
up is used.  
Table 7 Results relative to the protected FRP set-up 
Design fire Evacuation time [s] Average fatalities 
per simulation 
Average maximum 
FED 
1 625 0,02 0,21 
2 557 0,06 0,47 
3 507 0,70 0,77 
4 524 1,26 0,92 
 
 
In the values of Table 7 it can be observed that the maximum evacuation time is for the design 
fire 1 that is more than 59% larger that the drill time. Whereas for the fatalities and the 
maximum FED, fire number 4 has the largest values despite having the second lowest 
evacuation time.  
Studying the average max FED, the only case in which it is lower than the 0,3 is for fire 1; all 
the other cases present a value higher than the safety limit, being fire 4 the one presenting 
the highest value. 
An average maximum FED value of 0,92 for fire 4, means that there is at least 1 fatality in all 
the evacuation simulations, as shown in APPENDIX C and APPENDIX D, and with an average 
of fatalities per simulation of 1,26 it is clear that the most critical case for the unprotected 
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composite set-up is design fire number 4. For all the material configurations, the general trend 
is fire 4 to be the most critical case. 
3.3 Effect relative to the material set-up 
 
The results of the effect of changing the material set-up for each design fire are presented. 
Each one is analyzed focusing on the influence that is has on the evacuation process of the 
passenger deck, following the same methodology of the previous section. 
3.3.1 Fire 1 
 
In the following table the results for the evacuation runs for design fire 1 are presented in 
relation to the material set-up. 
Table 8  Results relative to design fire 1 
Material set-up Evacuation time [s] Average fatalities 
per simulation 
Average maximum 
FED 
Steel 578 0 0,17 
Unprotected FRP 465 0,40 0,46 
Protected FRP 625 0,02 0,21 
 
In the values of Table 8 it can be noted that the maximum evacuation time is for the protected 
composite set-up that is more than 59% larger that the drill time. Whereas the fatalities and 
the Maximum FED are related to the unprotected FRP set-up, despite having the lowest 
evacuation time. 
Studying the average max FED, there are two cases with an average maximum FED lower than 
0,3 which is the safety limit; the steel and the protected FRP set-up fulfill this criterion. On the 
other hand, the unprotected FRP case, having an average FED of 0,46 exceeds the limit 
becoming not safe for the evacuees. 
An average maximum FED value of 0,46 for the unprotected FRP case, means that there is at 
least 1 fatality in half of the evacuation simulations, also as shown in APPENDIX C and with an 
average of fatalities per simulation of 0,40 it is clear that the most critical case for design fire 
1 is the unprotected FRP configuration. 
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3.3.2 Fire 2 
 
In the following table the results for the evacuation runs for design fire 2 are presented in 
relation to the material set-up. 
Table 9  Results relative to design fire 2 
Material set-up Evacuation time [s] Average fatalities 
per simulation 
Average maximum 
FED 
Steel 586 0,06 0,39 
Unprotected FRP 459 0,46 0,61 
Protected FRP 557 0,06 0,47 
 
In the values of Table 9 it can be noted that the maximum evacuation time is for the steel set-
up that is more than 49% larger that the drill time. While the fatalities and the maximum FED 
are again related to the unprotected FRP set-up, despite having the lowest evacuation time.  
Studying the average maximum FED, none of the cases presents a FED value lower than 0,3 
making them all not safe for evacuation. The highest value of this variable appears with the 
unprotected FRP set-up. 
An average maximum FED value of 0,61 for the unprotected FRP case, means that there is at 
least 1 fatality in almost three quarters of the evacuation simulations, also as shown in 
APPENDIX C and with an average of fatalities per simulation of 0,46 it is clear that the most 
critical case for design fire 2 is the unprotected FRP configuration. 
3.3.3 Fire 3 
 
In the following table the results for the evacuation runs for design fire 3 are presented in 
relation to the material set-up. 
Table 10  Results relative to design fire 3 
Material set-up Evacuation time [s] Average fatalities 
per simulation 
Average maximum 
FED 
Steel 561 0,08 0,48 
Unprotected FRP 462 1,26 0,89 
Protected FRP 507 0,70 0,77 
 
In the values of Table 10 can be noted that the maximum evacuation time is for the steel set-
up, being more than 42% larger that the drill time. Whereas the fatalities and the Maximum 
FE, are again related to the unprotected FRP set-up, despite having the lowest evacuation 
time. 
 42 
 
Studying the average maximum FED, none of the cases presents a FED value lower than 0,3 
which is the safety limit. The highest value of this variable appears with the unprotected FRP 
set-up. 
An average maximum FED value of 0,89 for the unprotected FRP case, means that there is at 
least 1 fatality in more than three quarters of the evacuation simulations, also as shown in 
APPENDIX C and with an average of fatalities per simulation of 1,26 it is clear that the most 
critical case for design fire 3 is the unprotected FRP configuration.  
3.3.4 Fire 4 
 
In the following table the results for the evacuation runs for design fire 4 are presented in 
relation to the material set-up. 
Table 11  Results relative to design fire 4 
Material set-up Evacuation time [s] Average fatalities 
per simulation 
Average maximum 
FED 
Steel 505 1,30 0,90 
Unprotected FRP 249 4,48 1,00 
Protected FRP 524 1,26 0,92 
 
In the values of Table 11 can be noted that the maximum evacuation time is for the protected 
FRP set-up that is more than 33% larger that the drill time. Whereas the fatalities and the 
Maximum FED are once again related to the unprotected FRP set-up, despite having the 
lowest evacuation time. 
Studying the average maximum FED, none of the cases presents a FED lower than 0,3 which 
is the safety limit. The highest value of this variable appears with the unprotected FRP set-up. 
An average maximum FED value of 1 for the unprotected FRP case, means that there is at 
least 1 fatality in all of the evacuation simulations, also as shown in APPENDIX C and with an 
average of fatalities per simulation of 4,48 it is clear that the most critical case for design fire 
4 is the unprotected FRP configuration.  
This results make the unprotected FRP set-up the most critical configuration, especially when 
related to the design fire 4. Hence, the worst scenario by location and by material 
configuration is the design fire 4 combined with the unprotected FRP walls. 
3.4 Example case 
 
As an example case, the scenario comprising the protected composite set-up and the design 
fire 1 is selected. The reasons for this selection are based on the material configuration of 
most interest for this research and is one of the cases that has a FED below the threshold of 
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0,3. Thus, it becomes important to further analyze the other performance criteria. As 
explained in the methodology, the scenario is evaluated taking the performance criteria 
exposed in section 2.6. 
The first performance criterion to be taken into account is the FED. Its value has to be lower 
than 0,3 for the evacuation process to be carried out safely [20]. The present scenario has a 
FED value of 0,21 which fulfills the first performance criterion. 
The second criterion is the visibility. This parameter has to be larger than 10 m to be 
considered as safe [10]. Nevertheless, in Figure 13 Visibility slice at 48 [s]and 14 it can be 
noted that the visibility at exit 1 and exit 2 is below the threshold at 48 and 112 seconds 
respectively. In this case this criterion is not fulfilled. 
 
 
Figure 13 Visibility slice at 48 [s] for design fire 1 with protected FRP walls 
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Figure 14 Visibility slice at 112 [s] for design fire 1 with protected FRP walls 
When analyzing the next criterion, radiation to the floor, the accepted limit is 2,5 kW/m2 [10] 
for safe evacuation. Figure 15 shows that for this case the criterion is fulfilled as the radiation 
to the floor is well below the limit at all the measuring points. 
 
 
Figure 15 Radiation to the floor for design fire 1 with protected FRP walls 
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The last criterion to be assessed is the smoke layer height and its temperature. The limits for 
these quantities are 2 m above the ground and 200 °C [11], respectively. In Figure 16 Gas 
temperature at 2 m to Figure 18 Upper layer temperature, the results of the gas temperature 
at 2 m, the smoke layer height and the smoke layer temperature as a function of time are 
shown. For all three variables the criteria are not met, being the smoke layer height the first 
to exceed the accepted value at 40 [s], followed by the gas temperature at around 250 [s] and 
the upper layer temperature limit is exceeded at 300 [s]. The latter, being a condition for the 
radiation criterion, overrides the acceptance of the scenario for both criteria at the time 
previously mentioned. Hence, this case doesn’t fulfill the criterion of the smoke layer 
properties.  
 
 
Figure 16 Gas temperature at 2 m from the floor for design fire 1 with protected FRP walls 
In the previous image the gas temperature for each measuring point is plotted vs time, along 
with the performance safety limit. It’s clear how point number 1 exceed the limit first at 
around 250 seconds. 
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Figure 17 Smoke layer height for design fire 1 with protected FRP walls 
The smoke layer height in time is plotted in Figure 17.  The smoke layer height varies from 
point to point, however, the safety limit is first exceed in the measure point 1. 
 
Figure 18 Upper layer temperature for design fire 1 with protected FRP walls 
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Figure 18 shows the temperature of the smoke layer as a function of time. It’s calculated in 
FDS using the 2-zone model approximation, still this quantity gives a good image of the smoke 
temperature to assess the correspondent performance criterion. 
Despite the fulfillment of the FED criterion, the analyzed case does not meet the other 
performance criteria. Hence, the scenario cannot be considered as safe for the evacuation 
process. Additionally, solutions must be proposed since the RSET for this case is 625 [s] and 
the ASET is only 40 [s]. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
The results of the simulations are explained thoroughly in order to find relations, trends and 
the causes and the consequences of them. First, the mesh sensitivity is argued, followed by 
the results of the fire-evacuation simulations, then the example cases is analyzed and a 
comparison with the methods proposed by Gutiérrez [17] and the one by Azzi [24] are 
performed. The chapter finalizes with an assessment of the difficulty of applying a 
performance-prescriptive method for fire safety design in ships. 
 
4.1 Mesh sensitivity 
 
The mesh sensitivity analysis gave the optimal cell size as 12 cm. This result is derived from 
the behavior of the measured quantities whose plots are increasingly similar to each other. 
The observed differences between the calculated HRR and the experimental curves in Figure 
10, are due to the difference in the ventilation conditions between the simulations and the 
experimental set-up; it is well known that the ventilation conditions can significantly affect 
the development of a fire [9][13][23]. 
In the original experiment done by SP, the cabin was not confined within a deck but was in an 
open space with unlimited air supply, hence well-ventilated conditions were present thought-
out the complete experiment. On the other hand, in the simulations the cabin was confined 
within the deck with openings to fresh air relatively far from it, consequently limiting the 
available oxygen for the fire. This situation is well illustrated in Figure 19 where a slice of the 
oxygen mass fraction is shown for design fire 2 with the steel wall set-up. The image is taken 
at 400 s and in the fire area the oxygen mass fraction is around 7%. According to Drysdale 
[23], a fire in an environment with a low O2 concentration due to inadequate ventilation can 
either self-extinguish or continue burning but at a slower rate, depending on the quantity of 
oxygen that is available. This explains why at the beginning, the simulations follow exactly the 
experimental results and then differ from them when under-ventilated conditions are in 
place. Furthermore, Azzi et al [24] encountered a similar situation using the same 
experimental data where big fluctuations in the HRR curve, appeared around 900 s of the 
simulated time due to the drop on the oxygen levels and to avoid fuel burning far from the 
cabin, only the first phenomenon was seen in the present project as shown in Figure 10. 
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Figure 19 Oxygen mass fraction 
Another phenomenon that usually accompanies under-ventilated conditions in a fire is 
external flaming [23]. This also happens in the simulated fires as shown in Figure 20 where 
the lack of enough oxygen in relation to the volatized inflammable vapors inside the deck, 
causes they cannot ignite inside, but outside the compartment.  
 
Figure 20 external flaming caused by under-ventilated conditions inside the deck 
 
As it was mentioned in section 2.5, the HRRPUA curve of the laminate was got from an 
experimental set up were a radiation flux of 50 kW/m2 was used to ignite the composite. This 
heat flux has an influence on the measured peak heat release rate. This is better seen on 
Figure 21, adapted from Mouritz et al, chapter 3, page 75 [16], where the peak heat release 
 50 
 
rate of four glass fiber laminates with different resins is plotted against the heat flux from the 
cone calorimeter apparatus. 
 
Figure 21 Effect of heat flux on the peak HRR for various glass  polymer laminates 
The influence of the heat flux on the peak HRR is high when epoxy and phthalonitrile are used 
as resin and not as important when phenolic or cyanate ester are implemented. Despite 
having no information when PVEST is used, which is the resin used in the laminate that´s being 
studied in this thesis, it can be said from the behavior of the other resins, that the peak HRR 
will be affected and the value taken in this study could be not the best one. More data is 
needed in order to have a closer look at the influence of the heat flux used in the cone 
calorimeter test, on a laminate made of glass/vinyl ester. 
4.2 Effect of the fire location and material set-up 
 
The following figure is taken from the evacuation simulations for design fire 4 viewed in 
Smokeview®, where the long distances that some evacuees located in the wheelhouse have 
to walk to get to an exit are clear. Furthermore, these evacuees have to walk through smoke 
most of the time in their path to an exit, which explains the high numbers of fatalities and the 
large average max FED. Another reason for the high number of fatalities is the rapid 
development of hazardous conditions in the corridors even before the passengers emerge 
from the cabins, suffering this way a rapid increase on the FED and lowering their walking 
speed almost instantly. 
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Figure 22 Farthest areas of the deck to an exit 
 
If the different material set-up are considered, the worst case is when the walls are 
unprotected FRP. Despite of the under-ventilated conditions that the main fire area is 
subjected to, outside of it there is more oxygen available. Therefore, when the glass-fiber 
laminate reaches its ignition temperature it contributes to the heat and smoke production, 
thus the overall evacuation conditions become harsher for these cases. The significant 
contribution to the HRR of the cases with the unprotected FRP wall can be observed in Figure 
23, where the calculated total HRR of the design fire 1 is plotted with the three different 
material set-ups. Immediately after 200 seconds the unprotected FRP curve abruptly 
separates from the others peaking up to more than 10 MW. The large area of the walls is the 
main reason for the huge difference between the curves, once they reach 397 °C [16], they 
burn with a curve similar to the one shown in Figure 8 reaching more than 250 kW/m2 at its 
peak.   
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Figure 23 Difference in the HRR depending on the material set-up 
However, when using a passive protection for the FPR walls, the HRR curve remains practically 
unchanged when compared with the original steel set-up; the outcome of utilizing passive 
protection is highly positive reducing the total HRR of the fire. 
The material of the walls also has an influence on the temperatures inside of the 
compartment. Figure 24 shows the gas temperature at point 2 for the different materials. 
Once again, and in correspondence with the HRR curve, the case with unprotected FRP has 
the highest temperatures. However, this time there is a noticeable difference between the 
other two set-ups. The curve of the protected FRP is higher than the one of steel. The 
differences on the thermal properties is the factor making them differ. According to Drysdale 
[23] and Karlsson [13], the conductivity, density and specific heat capacity of the wall material, 
have a significant influence on the gas temperatures inside of a compartment. Since the 
passive protection applied on the FRP has a lower thermal conductivity than the plasterboard 
applied on the steel, the heat transfer is slower, hence the higher gas temperatures. Also, the 
thermal inertia of the plaster board is higher by 2 orders of magnitude making easier the heat 
transfer from the gas to the material, hence the lower temperatures. 
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Figure 24 Temperature at point 2 for the different material set-ups 
As a consequence of this, a closer look must be made when evaluating the temperature 
performance criterion since the temperatures will be higher and the ASET could become 
smaller. 
The radiation to the floor has a similar behavior as shown in Figure 25 where the radiation to 
floor is plotted in time for point 2. Again the unprotected set-up give the highest values even 
exceeding greatly the performance limit of 2,5 kW/m2, which is not surpassed by the other 
two material configurations. The higher temperature in the compartment using the protected 
set-up, is the reason of having a higher radiation to floor than in the steel set-up. 
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Figure 25 Radiation to the floor for the different material set-ups 
 
The other variable to take into account is the smoke layer height, plotted in Figure 26 in time; 
the influence of the material does not show until 200 seconds have passed, point to which 
the three curves behave practically the same way, surpassing the performance limit for safe 
evacuation of 2 m at the same moment. After this time, they start to differ more and more 
with the highest criticality shown for the unprotected FRP set-up, which also present a huge 
jump around 500 seconds that is also shown in the HRR curve in Figure 19. These abrupt 
changes are due to the under-ventilated conditions that hinder the combustion of the volatile 
gases but then, when enough oxygen comes into the compartment, the combustion process 
reinitiates, causing the smoke layer to drop back again and the HRR to increase.  
For this criterion, the use of passive protection for the FRP walls doesn’t make any difference 
regarding the safety of the evacuation process since, regardless of the material, the 
performance criterion is exceed at the same time. However, it will certainly avoid the extra 
smoke production due to the combustion of the laminate. 
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Figure 26 Smoke layer height for the different material set-ups at point 2 
 
When evaluating the influence of the design fire, the worst case for the evacuation is design 
fire 4. Its location causes that a considerable amount of evacuees have to walk through smoke 
causing the highest fatalities and the FED regardless of the material set-up being used. The 
reasons for this to occur are explained taking a look to the relevant data of the fire and smoke 
behavior. Firstly, the HRR of design fire 4 is higher than the other design fires, see Figure 27, 
and it is also reached faster; producing more smoke and heat at the initial phases of the 
evacuation which accompanied with a higher CO yield, has a bigger impact of the evacuees’ 
speed, reducing it due to the decreasing visibility and the increment of the FED value.  
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Figure 27 HRR for the different design fires 
 
As shown in Figure 28, the gas temperatures are higher for design fire 4 at the initial stages 
of the evacuation. It is important to point out that the location of fire 4 is the farthest one to 
the measuring point 2, hence the smoke produced by this fire has to fill first the room of 
origin, then the bigger room around it to only then reach the location of the gaging point. 
Despite this, fire 4 presents the highest temperature at the initial stages of the evacuation. 
Hereafter, the temperatures inside of the wheelhouse of the deck are expected to be higher, 
which is confirmed when looking at Figure 29 that shows the maximum temperature reached 
inside the mentioned room through which a considerable number of evacuees have to walk 
in smoke at more than 300 °C, in order to get to an exit. 
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Figure 28 Gas temperature for the different fires at point 2 
 
Figure 29 Maximum temperature reached at the wheelhouse for design fire 4 
The radiation to the floor is plotted in time in figure 26. Having a performance limit of 2,5 
kW/m2 makes it clear that none of the design fires exceeds this criterion, nonetheless, fire 4 
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presents the highest values during the evacuation process, which falls in relation with the high 
HRR at the same time frame. 
 
Figure 30 Radiation to the floor for the different design fires at point 2 
 
The last variable to analyze is the smoke layer height, shown in Figure 31, as a function of the 
time. At that measuring point, all of the fires exceed the criterion of 2 m within 100 seconds 
of the simulations, being fire 1 the first to do so. In this case, fire 4 is the last one to surpass 
the criterion but, as mentioned before, the distance of it to the gaging point has an influence. 
This is more clearly seen in Figure 32, where the smoke has already filled the wheelhouse 
compartment but still hasn’t reached the area (shown in red) where the measurements are 
made, reason why the correspondent values of smoke layer height exceed the criterion later 
than the other three design fires. However, in the wheelhouse the situation is more critical 
since the criterion is surpassed before, forcing evacuees in FDS EVAC to walk through thick 
smoke to get to an exit. 
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Figure 31 Smoke layer height at point 2 for the different design fires 
 
Figure 32 Smoke filling of the wheelhouse for design fire 4 
It is also interesting to see that the lowest evacuation times appear in the most critical cases, 
namely when the unprotected FRP or design fire 4 are present, being its combination the 
worst scenario. This case has a high average fatalities per run (4,48) but an evacuation time 
of 249 s which is even less that the time whit no fire influence on the evacuees. This happens 
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due to the way the evacuation time is measured. Regardless of the number of deaths, the 
egress time is estimated when the last living agent leaves the deck, therefore in a scenario 
where fatalities occur, the time to evacuate will be lower since fewer agents have to move 
through the narrow corridors of the deck. 
The opposite situation occurs for the safer scenarios with an average FED lower than 0,3 and 
with average fatalities close to zero, since all or most of the 73 evacuees are able to leave the 
deck, resulting in a longer evacuation time.  
4.3 Example case 
 
As explained before, the case taken as an example only fulfils one of the performance criteria, 
namely having an FED value below 0,30. Yet, this fulfillment must be treated with care since 
the FED calculation in FDS EVAC only takes into account the asphyxiating effects of CO and 
low O2 concentrations and the hyperventilation effect of the CO2. As a consequence, cases 
with FED values close to 0,3 may exceed this limit if more toxic gases are taken into account, 
for instance, the ones produced by the combustion of polyurethane, one of the dominant 
fuels used in this project, also produces isocyanates [10] that will increase the FED value and 
therefore affects negatively the evacuation process, also the FEC should be taken into account 
due to the production of nitrogen oxides  
When looking at the prescriptive side, IMO regulations are in place to limit the concentrations 
of toxic gases like halogenated acids, hydrogen cyanide and nitrogen oxides [6]. These gases, 
if present, will increase the FED value in the simulations. This suppose a limitation on the 
model and it should be taken with care 
Another issue worth mentioning is that of the requirement IMO has on the number of 
evacuation simulations that must be done per scenario. A total of 50 evacuation runs should 
be done per scenario, this in order to account for the stochastic variables that affect the 
models of human behavior and, therefore, the evacuation process. However, this number of 
simulations may be the correct one, according to Ronchi et al. [25], the presence of 
distributions and probabilistic variables creates a set of values of the human behavior 
variables that are changed from one simulation to another, thus introducing an additional 
uncertainty that seems affected by the number of simulations done of the same evacuation 
scenario. Ronchi et al. propose a method to quantify and to diminish this so called 
“behavioural uncertainty”, using functional analysis.  
Applying this method will certainly improve the calculations, since it gives the optimal number 
of runs to obtain convergence of the results and a better image of how each run affects the 
overall evacuation results. Therefore, the number of 50 runs proposed by IMO might not be 
enough to ensure the convergence of the evacuation time and the other variables, it may be 
that more or even less than 50 are needed to correctly analyze the evacuation. 
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4.4 Comparison with other methods 
 
As mentioned in section 1.1, there are other available methodologies to assess the influence 
of having FRP (protected and/or unprotected) in fire safety; they have points in common and 
certain differences between each other. In this section, a comparison of the present method 
with the ones proposed by Gutierrez et al. and Azzi et al, is done. The comparison is made on 
the basis of the scope, software, regulations, complexity of the procedure and the results 
gotten by each one. 
Azzi’s work and the present project, have a similar scope that is to measure the effect of using 
FRPs on the evacuation process, whereas the scope of Gutierrez’s project includes not only 
the safety of life (evacuation), but also the structural safety of the ship, which required them 
to also take into account the thermo-mechanical behavior of the composite. 
Software wise, the three methods use numerical tools to get the final results and to try and 
make their own method as accessible and general as possible. Despite the lack of information 
about the software used by Gutierrez, in Azzi’s work these are mentioned and bring a 
common point with the present project: the use of FDS as a fire calculation tool and the 
coupling of fire-evacuation simulations. 
One common feature between the three methodologies is that, despite applying 
performance-based design, they also strive to be compliant with the SOLAS and IMO 
regulations, which have important data about human behavior that is not easy to model or 
assume. 
Gutierrez et al, propose a method strongly based on experiments using cone calorimeter and 
thermo mechanic tests to get the relevant data to be used as an input to the models. On the 
other hand Azzi et al, offer a procedure that relies on the available literature to obtain the 
necessary data to be used in the models. This feature is common with the present project 
that also turns to the literature to get, for instance, the fire behavior of the laminate when 
exposed to high temperatures.  
Gutierrez’s method implies the availability of testing equipment in order to procure the fire 
data to perform the simulations. This makes the method more accurate but more time and 
resource consuming, that compared with the other two methods that may not be as accurate 
but they can deliver faster results at a fraction of the time, with the observation that literature 
data can be scarce about the fire behavior of the newest material combinations, in which case 
experiments should be performed to obtain the desired data.One point in which the present 
methodology differentiates itself from the other methods is the direct coupling of the fire and 
evacuation simulations. They are done simultaneously by one software (FDS) where only one 
input file per scenario has to be done, this way avoiding the process of exporting the fire data 
to another software that first, has to be modified in certain ways so it’d be able to read this 
data correctly. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The mesh sensitivity analysis resulted in a cell size of 12 cm. The differences between the 
calculated and experimental HRR curves are due to the appearance of under-ventilated 
conditions in the simulations.  
The effects of having unprotected FRP walls are negative in terms of the evacuation process 
and the fire and smoke development. 
Adding passive fire-protection to the FRP walls, greatly improves the fire safety performance 
of the glass-fiber laminate, with the only drawback of having higher temperatures inside of 
the compartment reducing the ASET, consequently, extra measures must be taken to reduce 
the RSET. 
FDS EVAC doesn’t allow assigning objectives to the evacuees, for instance the required IMO 
feature of counter-flow of crew members searching in the passenger cabins. 
IMO also requires that a night case should be done. This has a larger pre-movement time, 
however, as shown in this thesis, the day case already failed; hence there is no need to study 
the night case. 
Implementing FDS EVAC simplifies the coupling of fire-evacuation process allowing the user 
to model this interaction in a faster way than exporting the fire data to another software 
previously prepared to use it correctly. 
Performance-based design can be applied for ship evacuation design, however, with close 
support of literature and prescriptive codes, the latter especially for critical human behavior 
parameters. 
Since ventilation can have a great impact on the fire and smoke development, it would add 
value to include the effect of the ship’s ventilation system on the fire, since in this thesis it 
was assumed to be turned-off during the fire scenarios. 
In future works other design fires and material set-ups can be considered. Aluminum is also 
another lightweight material that can be used in ship building. 
The use of functional analysis to study the convergence of the evacuation results is advised 
and a comparison with the present results can prove its convergence or not. A method to 
perform this is already at hand to be applied for these cases. See Ronchi et al. [25] 
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APPENDIX A: EXAMPLES OF FDS INPUT FILE 
 
&HEAD CHID='f4c', TITLE='thesis' / 
Meshes    
&MESH IJK =328, 60, 30, XB = 19.5, 58.86 , 5.6 , 12.8, 0 , 3.6/       
&MESH IJK = 87, 120 , 30 , XB = 19.5, 29.94 , 12.8 ,27.2 , 0, 3.6/    
&MESH IJK = 328 , 54 , 30 , XB = 19.5, 58.86 , 27.2, 33.68, 0 , 3.6 /   
&MESH IJK = 168, 120 , 30  , XB = 46.5, 66.66 , 12.8, 27.2, 0 ,3.6  /    
&MESH IJK = 65, 90 , 30  , XB = 58.86, 66.66 , 2 , 12.8, 0 ,3.6  /    
&MESH IJK = 65, 96 , 30  , XB = 58.86, 66.66 , 27.2, 38.72 , 0 , 3.6  /    
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Evacuation meshes 
&MESH IJK=126, 89, 1, XB= 28.2 ,66 ,2.2 ,28.9 , 0.31, 2.2, EVAC_Z_OFFSET=0.8, EVACUATION=.TRUE., 
EVAC_HUMANS=.TRUE., ID='EVAC_MESH_1' /             
&MESH IJK=126, 87, 1, XB= 28.2 ,66 ,11.8,  37.9, 0.31, 2.2, EVAC_Z_OFFSET=0.8, EVACUATION=.TRUE., 
EVAC_HUMANS=.TRUE., ID='EVAC_MESH_2' /  
&MESH IJK=7, 119, 1, XB= 21.3 ,  23.4, 2.2 , 37.9, 0.31, 2.2, EVAC_Z_OFFSET=0.8, EVACUATION=.TRUE., 
EVAC_HUMANS=.TRUE., ID='EVAC_MESH_3' /  
&MESH IJK=36, 119, 1, XB=  22.2, 33 , 2.2 , 37.9, 0.31, 2.2, EVAC_Z_OFFSET=0.8, EVACUATION=.TRUE., 
EVAC_HUMANS=.TRUE., ID='EVAC_MESH_4' / 
============================================================================== 
&MISC  HUMIDITY=50, 
 SURF_DEFAULT='INERT', 
 RESTART= .FALSE., 
 NO_EVACUATION=.FALSE.,  
 NOISE=.FALSE., 
                EVAC_PRESSURE_ITERATIONS=30, 
 EVAC_TIME_ITERATIONS=50, 
                EVACUATION_DRILL=.FALSE., 
 EVACUATION_MC_MODE=.TRUE./ 
&RADI RADIATION= .TRUE./ 
&TIME T_END=700/ 
&SPEC ID = 'PVC', FORMULA = 'C2H3Cl' / 
&SPEC ID = 'OXYGEN', LUMPED_COMPONENT_ONLY = .TRUE. / 
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&SPEC ID = 'NITROGEN',           LUMPED_COMPONENT_ONLY = .TRUE. / 
&SPEC ID = 'HYDROGEN CHLORIDE',  LUMPED_COMPONENT_ONLY = .TRUE. / 
&SPEC ID = 'WATER VAPOR',        LUMPED_COMPONENT_ONLY = .TRUE. / 
&SPEC ID = 'CARBON DIOXIDE',     LUMPED_COMPONENT_ONLY = .TRUE. / 
&SPEC ID = 'CARBON MONOXIDE',    LUMPED_COMPONENT_ONLY = .TRUE. / 
&SPEC ID = 'SOOT',               LUMPED_COMPONENT_ONLY = .TRUE. / 
 
&SPEC ID='AIR', BACKGROUND=.TRUE. 
 SPEC_ID(1)='OXYGEN', VOLUME_FRACTION(1)=1.53, 
 SPEC_ID(2)='NITROGEN', VOLUME_FRACTION(2)=5.75 / 
&SPEC ID='PRODUCTS', 
 SPEC_ID(1)='HYDROGEN CHLORIDE', VOLUME_FRACTION(1)=1.0, 
 SPEC_ID(2)='WATER VAPOR',       VOLUME_FRACTION(2)=1.0, 
 SPEC_ID(3)='CARBON DIOXIDE',    VOLUME_FRACTION(3)=0.96, 
 SPEC_ID(4)='SOOT',              VOLUME_FRACTION(4)=0.90, 
 SPEC_ID(5)='NITROGEN',          VOLUME_FRACTION(5)=5.75, 
 SPEC_ID(6)='CARBON MONOXIDE',   VOLUME_FRACTION(6)=0.14 / 
 
&INIT MASS_FRACTION(1)=0, SPEC_ID(1)='PVC' / 
&REAC FUEL='PVC', HEAT_OF_COMBUSTION=16400, SPEC_ID_NU='PVC','AIR','PRODUCTS', 
NU=-1,-1,1 / 
============================================================================== 
Materials (This section varies depending on the material set-up being tested, in this case is the protected FRP)            
&MATL ID = 'DIVINYCELL_80' 
DENSITY = 80 
CONDUCTIVITY = 0.03 
SPECIFIC_HEAT = 1.75/  
&MATL ID = 'FIBERGLASS' 
DENSITY = 2580 
CONDUCTIVITY = 0.04 
SPECIFIC_HEAT = 0.9/  
&MATL ID = 'FIRE_MASTER' 
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DENSITY = 100 
CONDUCTIVITY= 0.08 
SPECIFIC_HEAT =0.8/  
============================================================================== 
Surfaces 
&SURF ID='BURNER', HRRPUA=417, COLOR='RED', RAMP_Q='fire_cable'/ 
&RAMP ID='fire_cable', T=0,F=0/ 
&RAMP ID='fire_cable', T=33,F=0.11/ 
&RAMP ID='fire_cable', T=66,F=0.43/ 
&RAMP ID='fire_cable', T=100,F=1/ 
&RAMP ID='fire_cable', T=280,F=1/ 
&RAMP ID='fire_cable', T=313,F=0.43/ 
&RAMP ID='fire_cable', T=346,F=0.11/ 
 
&SURF ID= 'COMPOSITE_WALL' 
 MATL_ID (1:5,1)= 'FIRE_MASTER','FIBERGLASS', 'DIVINYCELL_80', 'FIBERGLASS' , 'FIRE_MASTER' 
 COLOR= 'POWDER BLUE' 
 BACKING='EXPOSED' 
 THICKNESS (1:5) =0.1,0.002,0.046,0.002, 0.1/ 
&SURF ID = 'INERT2' 
 COLOR='BLACK'/ 
============================================================================== 
Fire, cabins and corridors 
&OBST XB= 49.5, 50, 20, 24.6 ,0.3,0.6, SURF_IDS='BURNER','INERT2','INERT2' /   
&OBST XB= 51.3, 51.8, 20, 24.6 ,0.3,0.6, SURF_IDS='BURNER','INERT2','INERT2' /   
=== 
&OBST XB= 21.5,21.8,5.6,33.8,0.3,3.6, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 1 
&OBST XB= 21.8,33.6,10.6,10.9,0.3,3.6,SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 2 
&OBST XB= 21.8,33.8,29.1,29.4,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 3 
&OBST XB= 33.5,33.8,29.4,33.7,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 4 
&OBST XB= 33.5,33.8,6.5,10.9,0.3,3.6, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 5 
&OBST XB= 33.5,33.8,5.6,10.9,0.3,3.6, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 5 
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&OBST XB = 33.8,59.4,33.4,33.7,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 6 
&OBST XB = 33.5,59.4,6.3,6.6,0.3,3.6, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 7 
&OBST XB= 59.4,59.7,2.2,6.8,0.3,3.6, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 8 
&OBST XB= 59.4,59.7,33.4,37.4,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 9 
&OBST XB= 59.4,65.7,37.4,37.7,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 10 
&OBST XB= 59.4,65.7,2.5,2.8,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 11 
&OBST XB= 65.7,65.9,2.5,37.7,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 12 
&OBST XB= 33.8,50.8,10.3,10.6,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 15 
&OBST XB= 50.5,50.8,6.5,10.3,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 16 
&OBST XB= 50.8,54.8,9.4,9.7,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 17 
&OBST XB= 54.8,55.1,6.5,9.7,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 18 
&OBST XB= 54.8,55.1,9.7,11.6,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 19 
&OBST XB= 53.5,55.1,11.6,11.9,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 20 
&OBST XB= 53.5,53.8,11.9,16,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 21 
&OBST XB= 48.9,59.4,16,16.3,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 22 
&OBST XB= 48.9,49.2,16.3,28.3,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 23 
&OBST XB= 59.4,59.7,6.8,16.3,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 24 
&OBST XB= 49.2,58.7,28,28.3,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 25 
&OBST XB= 49.2,59.7,24.8,25.1,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 26 
&OBST XB= 58.4,58.7,25.1,28,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 27 
&OBST XB= 59.4,59.7,25.1,33.4,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 28 
&OBST XB= 36.5,59.4,30.2,30.5,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 29 
&OBST XB= 33.8,36.2,29.2,29.5,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 30 
&OBST XB= 36.2,36.5,29.2,33.4,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 31 
&OBST XB= 27.8,28.1,10.7,29.2,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 32 
&OBST XB= 29.3,29.6,12.2,28,0.3,3,  SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 33 
&OBST XB= 29.6,39.4,27.7,28,0.3,3,  SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 34 
&OBST XB= 39.4,39.7,27.7,28.3,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 34 con 35 
&OBST XB= 39.4,47.4,28.3,28.6,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 35 
&OBST XB= 47.1,47.4,14.6,28.6,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 36 
&OBST XB= 47.1,51.7,14.5,14.8,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 37 
&OBST XB= 51.4,51.7,11.8,14.5,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 38 
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&OBST XB= 36,51.4,11.8,12.1,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 39 
&OBST XB= 36,36.3,12.1,12.5,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ Wall 39 con 40 
&OBST XB= 29.6,36,12.2,12.5,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 40 
&OBST XB= 51.8,52.1 ,18.9,24.8 ,0.3 ,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 41 
&OBST XB= 49.2, 52.1, 18.6, 18.9,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 42 
&OBST XB= 21.8, 26.1, 24.4 , 24.7 ,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 43 
&OBST XB= 25.8, 26.1, 24.7 , 28 ,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 44 
&OBST XB= 26.1, 27.8, 27.7, 28 ,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/  Wall 45 
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Floor and ceiling 
&OBST XB= 21.8,33.5,10.7,29.5,0,0.3, SURF_IDS='COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL', 
COLOR='INVISIBLE'/  
&OBST XB= 21.5,33.5,10.7,29.5,3,3.3, SURF_IDS='COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL', 
COLOR='INVISIBLE'/  
&OBST XB= 33.5,59.4,6.5,33.7,0,0.3, SURF_IDS='COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL', 
COLOR='INVISIBLE'/  
&OBST XB= 33.5,59.4,6.5,33.7,3,3.3, SURF_IDS='COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL', 
COLOR='INVISIBLE'/  
&OBST XB= 59.4,66,2.5,37.7,0,0.3, SURF_IDS='COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL', 
COLOR='INVISIBLE'/  
&OBST XB= 59.4,66,2.5,37.7,3,3.3, SURF_IDS='COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL', 
COLOR='INVISIBLE'/  
============================================================================== 
Vents 
&VENT XB= 16.5,21.5, 2,38.3, 3.6, 3.6, SURF_ID='OPEN'/  
&VENT XB = 16.5 , 16.5, 2 , 38.3, 0 , 3.6, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB = 16.5 , 21.5 , 33.8 , 33.8, 0 , 3.6, SURF_ID='OPEN'/ 
&VENT XB = 16.5 , 21.5 , 5.6 , 5.6, 0 , 3.6, SURF_ID='OPEN'/  
============================================================================== 
Doors 
&HOLE XB= 27.5,28.4,28,28.9,0.3,2.4/ 
&HOLE XB= 21.4,22,28,28.9,0.3,2.4/ 
&HOLE XB = 51.8, 52.3, 19.2,20.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 /  
&HOLE XB =52.1,53,15.9,16.4,0.3,2.4 / 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
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EVACUATION GEOMETRY 
&OBST XB = 21.3, 33.5, 29.4, 37.9, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='INVISIBLE'/ 
&OBST XB = 33.5, 59.4, 33.7, 37.9, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='INVISIBLE'/ 
&OBST XB = 21.3, 33.5, 2.2, 10.6, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='INVISIBLE'/ 
&OBST XB = 33.5, 59.4, 2.2, 6.3, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='INVISIBLE'/ 
&OBST XB = 33.5, 43.1, 14.8, 24.4, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='INVISIBLE'/ 
&OBST XB = 33.5, 36, 12.1, 14.8 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='INVISIBLE'/ 
&OBST XB = 36, 36.3, 6.6, 10.3, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 1 
&OBST XB = 38.8, 39.1, 6.6, 10.3, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 2-3 
&OBST XB = 41.6, 41.9, 6.6, 10.3, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 3-4 
&OBST XB = 44.4, 44.7, 6.6, 10.3, 0.3, 3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 4-5 
&OBST XB = 36.1, 47.1, 14.5,14.8,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  
&OBST XB = 36,36.3,12.5,14.5,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ 
&OBST XB= 33.2,33.5,12.5,27.7,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ 
&OBST XB= 29.6,33.5, 25.1, 25.4 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 6 
&OBST XB= 29.6,33.5, 22.5, 22.8 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 7-8 
&OBST XB= 29.6,33.5, 19.9, 20.2 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin 8-9 
&OBST XB= 29.6,33.5, 17.3, 17.6 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin 9-10 
&OBST XB= 29.6,33.5, 14.7, 15 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin 10-11 
&OBST XB= 33.5,39.4,24.1,24.4,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ 
&OBST XB= 39.4,39.7,24.1,27.7,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 12-13 
&OBST XB= 39.7,47.1,24.7,25 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ 
&OBST XB= 36.3, 36.6,24.4 ,27.7 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin f2-12 
&OBST XB= 42.1, 42.4, 25, 28.3 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 13-14 
&OBST XB= 44.8, 45.1, 25, 28.3,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 14-15 
&OBST XB= 43.1,43.4,14.9,24.7,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ 
&OBST XB= 43.4,47.1,21.4,21.7 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 16-17 
&OBST XB= 43.4,47.1,17.8,18.1 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 17-18 
&OBST XB = 38.7,39,12.1,14.5,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 19-20 
&OBST XB = 41.4,41.7,12.1,14.5,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 20-21 
&OBST XB = 44.1,44.4,12.1,14.5,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 21-22 
&OBST XB = 46.8,47.1,12.1,14.5,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 22-23 
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&OBST XB = 49.5,49.8,12.1,14.5,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 23-24 
&OBST XB= 52.6,52.9,25.1,28,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 25-26 
&OBST XB= 55.6,55.9,25.1,28,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ cabin 26-27 
&OBST XB= 55.2,55.5,30.5, 33.4,0.3,3,  EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin 28 
&OBST XB= 49.1,49.4,30.5, 33.4,0.3,3,  EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin 29 
&OBST XB= 45.4,45.7,30.5, 33.4,0.3,3,  EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin 29-30 
&OBST XB= 42.4,42.7,30.5, 33.4,0.3,3,  EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin 30-31 
&OBST XB= 39.4,39.7,30.5, 33.4,0.3,3,  EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  cabin 31 
&OBST XB= 49.4,55.2,30.5, 33.4,0.3,3,  EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='INVISIBLE'/ 
&OBST XB= 21.3, 27.8, 10.6, 24.4,0.3,3,  EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='INVISIBLE'/ 
&OBST XB= 55.1,59.4,11.6,11.9,0.3,3,  EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/ 
&OBST XB= 24, 25.8, 27.7, 28 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  
&OBST XB= 23.7, 24, 24.7, 28 ,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  
&OBST XB= 59.4,59.7, 16.3, 25.1 ,0.3,3, SURF_IDS='INERT2','COMPOSITE_WALL','INERT2'/ 
&OBST XB= 47,47.3,6.5,10.3,0.3,3, EVACUATION=.TRUE., COLOR='BLUE'/  
 
Cabin Doors 
&HOLE XB = 59, 60, 20.2,21.2 ,0.3 ,2.4 / 
&HOLE XB =48.5,49.4,9,11,0.3,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 51.8, 52.3, 19.2,20.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 34.9, 35.8, 10.2, 10.7 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 37.1, 38, 10.2, 10.7 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 39.9, 40.8, 10.2, 10.7 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 42.8, 43.7, 10.2, 10.7 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 45.6, 46.5, 10.2, 10.7 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 37.1, 38, 11.7, 12.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 39.9, 40.8, 11.7, 12.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 42.5, 43.4, 11.7, 12.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 45.4, 46.3, 11.7, 12.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 47.8, 48.7, 11.7, 12.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 50, 50.9, 11.7, 12.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 29.4,29.7, 13.2, 14.1 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
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&HOLE XB = 29.4,29.7, 15.7, 16.6 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 29.4,29.7, 18.3, 19.2 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 29.4,29.7, 20.9, 21.8 ,0.3 ,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 29.4,29.7, 23.5, 24.4 ,0.3 , 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 29.4, 29.7, 26.1, 27 ,0.3 , 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&HOLE XB = 34.9, 35.8, 27.6, 28.1,0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 37.4, 38.3, 27.6, 31, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 40.5, 41.4, 27.8, 31, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 43.3, 44.2, 27.8, 31, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 45.8, 46.7, 27.8, 29, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 46.8, 47.7, 30, 31, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 56.6, 57.5, 25, 31, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 50.6, 51.5, 27.5, 28.6, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 53.6, 54.5, 27.5, 28.6, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 56.8, 57.7, 11.5, 12, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 54.7,55.2,10.1,11, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 46,48, 22.6,23.5, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 46,48, 19.3, 20.2 , 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 46,48, 15.7, 16.6, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&HOLE XB = 59, 60, 29, 29.9, 0.3, 2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
Exits 
/1 
&HOLE XB =  52.5,53.4,9.4,9.8,0.3,2.3 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&EXIT ID='Ex1', IOR = -2, 
     COLOR='YELLOW', HEIGHT=2, SHOW=.TRUE., 
      XYZ= 52.8, 9.5, 1.3, 
      XB= 52.5,53.4,9.4,9.4,0.31,2.2/ 
/2 
&HOLE XB =  33.9,34.8,29.2,29.6,0.3,2.4 , EVACUATION=.TRUE. / 
&EXIT ID='Ex2', IOR = +2, 
      COLOR='YELLOW', HEIGHT=2, SHOW=.TRUE., 
      XYZ= 34.3, 29.3, 1.3, 
 74 
 
      XB= 33.9,34.8,29.5,29.5,0.31,2.2/ 
/3  
&HOLE XB= 21.3,22,28,28.9,0.3,2.4,  EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&EXIT ID='Ex3', IOR = -1, 
            COLOR='YELLOW', HEIGHT=2, SHOW=.TRUE., 
      XYZ= 21.8, 28.3, 1.3, 
      XB= 21.6, 21.6, 28,28.9, 0.31, 2.2/ 
/4 
&HOLE XB= 23.6,24.1,26.5,27.7,0.3,2.4,  EVACUATION=.TRUE./ 
&EXIT ID='Ex4', IOR = +1, 
      COLOR='YELLOW', HEIGHT=2, SHOW=.TRUE., 
      XYZ= 23.9, 27.2, 1.3, 
      XB= 24, 24, 26.5,27.7, 0.31, 2.2/ 
============================================================================== 
PERSONS 
&PERS   ID='Child', 
 FYI='IMO properties being used ', 
 DEFAULT_PROPERTIES='Child', 
 HUMAN_SMOKE_HEIGHT=1.6, 
 PRE_EVAC_DIST=5, 
 PRE_MEAN=3.44, 
 PRE_PARA=0.94, 
 PRE_HIGH=400, 
 PRE_PARA2=0, 
 OUTPUT_FED=.TRUE., 
 TDET_SMOKE_DENS= 650, 
 COLOR_METHOD=0/ 
&PERS   ID='Male', 
 FYI='IMO properties being used ', 
 DEFAULT_PROPERTIES='Male', 
 HUMAN_SMOKE_HEIGHT=1.7, 
 PRE_EVAC_DIST=5, 
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 PRE_MEAN=3.44, 
 PRE_PARA=0.94, 
 PRE_HIGH=400, 
 PRE_PARA2=0, 
 OUTPUT_FED=.TRUE., 
 TDET_SMOKE_DENS= 650, 
 COLOR_METHOD=0/ 
&PERS   ID='Female', 
 FYI='IMO properties being used ', 
 DEFAULT_PROPERTIES='Female', 
 HUMAN_SMOKE_HEIGHT=1.7, 
 PRE_EVAC_DIST=5, 
 PRE_MEAN=3.44, 
 PRE_PARA=0.94, 
 PRE_HIGH=400, 
 PRE_PARA2=0, 
 OUTPUT_FED=.TRUE., 
 TDET_SMOKE_DENS= 650, 
 COLOR_METHOD=0/ 
&PERS   ID='Elderly', 
 FYI='IMO properties being used ', 
 DEFAULT_PROPERTIES='Elderly', 
 HUMAN_SMOKE_HEIGHT=1.7, 
 PRE_EVAC_DIST=5, 
 PRE_MEAN=3.44, 
 PRE_PARA=0.94, 
 PRE_HIGH=400, 
 PRE_PARA2=0, 
 OUTPUT_FED=.TRUE., 
 TDET_SMOKE_DENS= 650, 
 COLOR_METHOD=0/ 
&PERS   ID='Female_crew', 
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 FYI='IMO properties being used ', 
 DEFAULT_PROPERTIES='Female', 
 VELOCITY_DIST= 1, 
 VEL_LOW=0.93, 
 VEL_HIGH=1.55, 
 PRE_EVAC_DIST=5, 
 PRE_MEAN=3.44, 
 PRE_PARA=0.94, 
 PRE_HIGH=400, 
 PRE_PARA2=0, 
 HUMAN_SMOKE_HEIGHT=1.7, 
 OUTPUT_FED=.TRUE., 
 TDET_SMOKE_DENS= 650, 
 COLOR_METHOD=0/ 
&PERS   ID='Male_crew', 
 FYI='IMO properties being used ', 
 DEFAULT_PROPERTIES='Male' 
 VELOCITY_DIST= 1, 
 VEL_LOW=1.11, 
 VEL_HIGH=1.85, 
 PRE_EVAC_DIST=5, 
 PRE_MEAN=3.44, 
 PRE_PARA=0.94, 
 PRE_HIGH=400, 
 PRE_PARA2=0, 
 HUMAN_SMOKE_HEIGHT=1.7, 
 OUTPUT_FED=.TRUE., 
 TDET_SMOKE_DENS= 650, 
 COLOR_METHOD=0/ 
============================================================================== 
Initial position of evacuees 
&EVAC ID='Male_crew', 
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 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=12, 
 XB= 28.2 ,66 ,2.2,  20.05, 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='SEPIA', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_1', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1' ,'Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 1,0.5,1,1, 
 FLOW_FIELD_ID='EVAC_MESH_1', 
 PERS_ID='Male_crew'/ 
&EVAC ID='Male_crew_2', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=13, 
 XB= 28.2 ,66 ,20.05,  37.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='SEPIA', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_2', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1' ,'Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 1,0.5,1,1, 
 FLOW_FIELD_ID='EVAC_MESH_1', 
 PERS_ID='Male_crew'/ 
&EVAC ID='Female_crew', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=13, 
 XB= 28.2 ,66 ,2.2,  20.05, 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='SEPIA', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_1', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1' ,'Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 1,0.5,1,1, 
 FLOW_FIELD_ID='EVAC_MESH_1', 
 PERS_ID='Female_crew'/ 
&EVAC ID='Female_crew_2', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=13, 
 XB= 28.2 ,66 ,20.05,  37.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='SEPIA', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_2', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1' ,'Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
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 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 1,0.5,1,1, 
 FLOW_FIELD_ID='EVAC_MESH_1', 
 PERS_ID='Female_crew'/ 
&EVAC ID='Children', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=2, 
 XB= 28.2 ,59.4 ,2.2 ,20.05 , 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='BLUE', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_1', 
 PERS_ID='Child'/ 
&EVAC ID='Children_2', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=2, 
 XB= 28.2 ,59.4 ,20.05,37.9 , 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='BLUE', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_2', 
 PERS_ID='Child'/ 
&EVAC ID='Females', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=3, 
 XB= 28.2 ,59.4 ,2.2,  20.05, 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='BLACK', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_1', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1','Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 1,0.5,0,0.5, 
 PERS_ID='Female'/ 
&EVAC ID='Females_2', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=2, 
 XB= 28.2 ,59.4 ,20.05,  37.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='BLACK', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_2', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1','Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 0.5,1,0,0.5, 
 PERS_ID='Female'/ 
&EVAC ID='Males', 
 79 
 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=2, 
 XB= 28.2 ,59.4 ,2.2 ,20.05 , 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='GREEN', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_1', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1','Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 1,0.5,0,0.5, 
 PERS_ID='Male'/ 
&EVAC ID='Males_2', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=3, 
 XB= 28.2 ,59.4 ,20.05 ,37.9 , 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='GREEN', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_2', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1','Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 0.5,1,0,0.5, 
 PERS_ID='Male'/ 
&EVAC ID='Elderly', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=4, 
 XB= 28.2 ,59.4 ,2.2 ,20.05 , 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='YELLOW', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_1', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1','Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 1,0.5,0,0.5, 
 PERS_ID='Elderly'/ 
&EVAC ID='Elderly_2', 
 NUMBER_INITIAL_PERSONS=4, 
 XB= 28.2 ,59.4 ,20.05 ,37.9 , 0.31, 2.2 
 AVATAR_COLOR='YELLOW', 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_2', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_NAMES='Ex1','Ex2', 'Ex3', 'Ex4', 
 KNOWN_DOOR_PROBS = 0.5,1,0,0.5, 
 PERS_ID='Elderly'/ 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
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Places where no agents will be generated 
&EVHO ID='fire area', 
 XB= 49, 52, 18.5, 25,0.31,2.2 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='fire area_2', 
 XB= 49, 52, 18.5, 25,0.31,2.2 
 MESH_ID = 'EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID = 'Exit1', 
 XB= 50.5, 55.1 , 6.3, 11 , 0.31, 2.2 / 
&EVHO ID = 'Exit2', 
 XB = 33.5, 36.5, 29.2, 33.7, 0.31,  2.2/ 
&EVHO ID = 'Exit3', 
 XB = 21.3, 22.5, 24, 30 ,0.31 ,2.2/ 
&EVHO ID = 'Exit3_1', 
 XB = 22.2, 28, 24, 30 ,0.31 ,2.2/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 2.5, 28.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Females', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house1_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 2.5, 28.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Females_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house1_1_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 28.9, 37.7, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Females', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house1_1_1_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 28.9, 37.7, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Females_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house2', 
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 XB= 49, 58.7, 16,25 ,0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Females', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house2_1', 
 XB= 49, 58.7, 16,25 ,0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Females_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house3', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 2.5, 28.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Males', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house3_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 2.5, 28.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Males_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house3_1_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 28.9, 37.7, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Males', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house3_1_1_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 28.9, 37.7, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Males_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house4', 
 XB= 49, 58.7, 16,25 ,0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Males', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house4_1', 
 XB= 49, 58.7, 16,25 ,0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Males_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house5', 
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 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 2.5, 28.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Children', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house5_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 2.5, 28.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Children_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house5_1_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 28.9, 37.7, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Children', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house5_1_1_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 28.9, 37.7, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Children_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house6', 
 XB= 49, 58.7, 16,25 ,0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Children', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house6_1', 
 XB= 49, 58.7, 16,25 ,0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Children_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house7', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 2.5, 28.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Elderly', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house7_1', 
 XB= 58.7, 65.7, 2.5, 28.9, 0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Elderly_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house8', 
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 XB= 49, 58.7, 16,25 ,0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Elderly', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_1'/ 
&EVHO ID='Wheel_house8_1', 
 XB= 49, 58.7, 16,25 ,0.31, 2.2 
 EVAC_ID='Elderly_2', 
 MESH_ID='EVAC_MESH_2'/ 
============================================================================== 
&SLCF PBZ= 1, QUANTITY='VELOCITY', VECTOR=.TRUE., EVACUATION = .TRUE./ 
============================================================================== 
DEVICES  
&BNDF QUANTITY= 'WALL TEMPERATURE'/ 
============================================================= 
Gas' temperatures and velicity 
&DEVC XYZ= 40.5, 11.4 , 2.3, ID= 'Tco 1' , QUANTITY = 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ=  50.5 , 15.4 , 2.3, ID= 'Tco 2'  , QUANTITY = 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ= 48.2,21.5, 2.3 ,  ID= 'Tco 3'  , QUANTITY = 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ= 38.4 , 29.4 , 2.3, ID= 'Tco 4'  , QUANTITY = 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XYZ=  28.7, 20.1 ,  2.3 , ID= 'Tco 5'  , QUANTITY = 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&SLCF PBZ = 2.3, QUANTITY = 'TEMPERATURE'/ 
&SLCF PBZ = 2.3, QUANTITY = 'VELOCITY', VECTOR =.TRUE./ 
============================================================ 
Radiation to the floor 
&DEVC XYZ= 40.5, 11.4 , 0.3, ID= 'Rco 1' , QUANTITY = 'INCIDENT HEAT FLUX', IOR = 3/ 
&DEVC XYZ=  50.5 , 15.4 , 0.3, ID= 'Rco 2' , QUANTITY = 'INCIDENT HEAT FLUX', IOR = 3/ 
&DEVC XYZ= 48.2,21.5, 0.3 ,  ID= 'Rco 3' , QUANTITY = 'INCIDENT HEAT FLUX', IOR = 3/ 
&DEVC XYZ= 38.4 , 29.4 , 0.3,  ID= 'Rco 4' , QUANTITY = 'INCIDENT HEAT FLUX' , IOR = 3/ 
&DEVC XYZ=  28.7, 20.1 ,  0.3 , ID= 'Rco 5' , QUANTITY = 'INCIDENT HEAT FLUX' , IOR = 3/ 
============================================================ 
Visibility 
&SLCF PBZ = 2.3, QUANTITY = 'VISIBILITY'/ 
=========================================== 
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O2 mass fraction 
&SLCF XB= 19.5, 66, 2, 38, 0.3 ,2.3 , QUANTITY='MASS FRACTION', SPEC_ID='OXYGEN'/ 
============================================================ 
Smoke layer height and temperature 
&DEVC XB= 40.5, 40.5, 11.4 , 11.4 , 0.3 , 3, ID= 'SHco 1' , QUANTITY = 'LAYER HEIGHT'/ 
&DEVC XB=  50.5 ,50.5 , 15.4 , 15.4 , 0.3 , 3, ID= 'SHco 2'  , QUANTITY = 'LAYER HEIGHT'/ 
&DEVC XB= 48.2 , 48.2 ,21.5, 21.5, 0.3 , 3 ,  ID= 'SHco 3'  , QUANTITY = 'LAYER HEIGHT'/ 
&DEVC XB= 38.4 , 38.4 , 29.4 , 29.4 , 0.3 , 3, ID= 'SHco 4'  , QUANTITY = 'LAYER HEIGHT'/ 
&DEVC XB=  28.7,  28.7 , 20.1 , 20.1 , 0 , 3 , ID= 'SHco 5'  , QUANTITY = 'LAYER HEIGHT'/ 
&DEVC XB= 40.5, 40.5, 11.4 , 11.4 , 0.3 , 3, ID= 'SUTco 1' , QUANTITY = 'UPPER TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XB=  50.5 ,50.5 , 15.4 , 15.4 , 0.3 , 3, ID= 'SUTco 2'  , QUANTITY = 'UPPER TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XB= 48.2 , 48.2 ,21.5,  21.5, 0.3 , 3 ,  ID= 'SUTco 3'  , QUANTITY = 'UPPER TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XB= 38.4 , 38.4 , 29.4 , 29.4 , 0.3 , 3, ID= 'SUTco 4'  , QUANTITY = 'UPPER TEMPERATURE'/ 
&DEVC XB=  28.7, 28.7 , 20.1 , 20.1 , 0 , 3 , ID= 'SUTco 5'  , QUANTITY = 'UPPER TEMPERATURE'/ 
&TAIL / 
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APPENDIX B: MESH SENSITIVITY GRAPHS 
 
 
Figure 33 Gas temperature at point 1 for all meshes 
 
Figure 34 Gas temperature at point 2 for all meshes 
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Figure 35 Gas temperature at point 4 for all meshes 
 
 
Figure 36 Gas temperature at point 5 for all meshes 
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Figure 37 Radiation to the floor at point 1 for all the meshes 
 
Figure 38 Radiation to the floor at point 2 for all the meshes 
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Figure 39 Radiation to the floor at point 4 for all the meshes 
 
Figure 40 Radiation to the floor at point 5 for all the meshes 
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APPENDIX C: COMPLETE EVACUATION RESULTS 
 
Table 12 Evacuation results for the steel set-up 
Fire 1 Fire 2 Fire 3 Fire 4 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
261 0,03 249 0,04 299 0,17 204 2 
262 0,03 273 0,08 314 0,17 211 3 
287 0,09 300 0,08 328 0,31 223 1 
292 0,06 316 0,12 339 1 227 4 
310 0,09 340 0,13 359 0,30 237 0,16 
316 0,04 344 0,12 360 0,29 238 1 
317 0,07 361 0,20 361 0,32 256 2 
323 0,07 365 0,15 364 0,34 283 0,18 
323 0,09 368 1 373 0,17 291 0,33 
328 0,04 370 0,15 377 0,36 297 1 
349 0,05 384 0,17 378 0,17 300 1 
362 0,14 391 0,24 380 0,30 305 0,99 
373 0,14 393 0,27 384 0,40 317 2 
373 0,07 395 0,19 386 0,28 321 2 
381 0,17 396 0,23 390 0,21 337 2 
391 0,09 401 0,17 394 0,22 347 1 
395 0,10 414 0,37 395 0,37 361 0,73 
398 0,07 414 0,24 396 0,37 363 6 
402 0,18 417 0,25 396 1 370 0,98 
408 0,12 418 0,25 398 0,37 377 2 
410 0,11 428 0,27 403 0,27 384 0,60 
410 0,18 431 1 409 0,37 389 3 
412 0,11 440 0,41 413 0,41 392 0,97 
414 0,10 440 0,31 413 0,32 396 2 
418 0,12 440 0,29 416 0,45 400 1 
424 0,10 442 0,26 418 0,43 404 0,35 
430 0,20 445 0,26 422 0,47 405 1 
432 0,10 454 0,33 426 0,51 406 1 
445 0,24 458 0,27 443 0,27 407 0,81 
448 0,21 459 0,32 452 0,40 411 0,62 
460 0,28 461 0,35 455 0,36 414 2 
467 0,20 467 0,35 456 0,37 416 2 
471 0,19 468 0,20 464 0,32 417 1 
474 0,16 475 0,38 468 1 418 4 
478 0,17 481 0,40 468 1 422 4 
484 0,18 489 0,41 477 0,64 423 0,88 
484 0,16 495 0,43 484 0,71 424 1 
491 0,35 496 0,38 487 0,64 428 0,74 
492 0,19 503 0,47 488 0,56 435 2 
496 0,17 519 0,69 489 0,59 438 0,93 
502 0,21 530 0,57 494 0,74 438 1 
506 0,21 537 0,43 494 0,41 440 0,97 
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506 0,21 540 0,77 498 0,43 440 0,93 
548 0,34 550 0,66 505 0,52 440 0,84 
571 0,43 561 1 509 0,88 443 2 
583 0,34 561 0,59 540 0,49 446 1 
587 0,36 571 0,67 565 0,91 469 1 
588 0,34 600 0,79 607 0,78 491 3 
594 0,27 615 0,88 613 0,82 503 2 
614 0,57 644 0,99 662 0,97 530 1 
 
Table 13 Evacuation results for unprotected composite set-up 
Fire 1 Fire 2 Fire 3 Fire 4 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
174 0,00 219 0,02 157 3 130 2 
174 1 220 1 180 2 133 3 
188 1 220 1 209 1 136 5 
194 0,02 229 0,03 226 0,19 138 5 
204 1 243 0,04 240 2 148 2 
205 0,00 247 3 247 0,13 149 4 
206 0,01 255 1 284 1 150 6 
207 0,01 257 0,10 289 1 151 6 
207 0,02 260 0,11 295 1 151 6 
208 0,01 273 0,08 301 2 155 3 
214 0,01 274 0,14 307 0,52 157 3 
218 0,04 280 0,16 309 3 159 3 
230 0,02 296 1 310 0,20 160 4 
232 0,01 300 1 311 1 162 4 
234 0,01 305 0,25 318 2 172 3 
256 0,03 313 0,28 320 0,77 178 5 
258 1 313 0,28 321 2 185 6 
260 0,07 315 1 323 1 191 1 
271 1 316 0,29 330 2 192 4 
279 1 327 0,50 330 0,91 193 5 
281 1 339 0,64 332 3 194 6 
285 0,05 342 0,23 333 1 197 9 
300 1 344 0,37 335 1 198 4 
310 0,14 344 1 335 2 199 2 
318 0,05 344 1 344 2 200 4 
326 1 346 0,38 345 2 200 3 
330 1,00 347 1 349 1 200 3 
331 0,07 353 0,11 351 0,34 201 4 
335 0,22 358 1 356 0,07 204 1 
337 0,17 363 0,77 356 0,94 207 5 
338 0,18 364 1 356 0,89 208 6 
351 0,11 364 0,19 380 2 208 5 
361 0,14 378 0,56 385 3 211 4 
372 0,17 378 0,56 395 1 212 3 
376 0,29 387 1 396 1 212 7 
386 0,49 390 2 400 4 212 7 
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386 2 393 1 402 1 213 6 
393 0,29 394 0,62 403 1 214 7 
399 0,73 398 0,65 403 3 216 7 
403 0,39 400 1 405 3 216 5 
404 1 419 0,73 411 2 217 3 
410 3 430 1 420 1 217 4 
412 0,41 438 0,84 424 0,92 225 5 
419 0,40 440 1 430 0,71 225 4 
431 1 442 0,87 430 2 226 7 
440 0,83 443 1 445 0,81 243 4 
459 1 447 1 447 1 247 10 
473 0,77 450 0,87 452 1 249 4 
491 2 457 0,68 452 0,99 257 5 
491 0,80 459 0,98 461 1 263 0,93 
 
Table 14 Evacuation results for protected composite set-up 
Fire 1 Fire 2 Fire 3 Fire 4 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
Travel 
time 
[s] 
Max 
FED/Deads 
266 0,06 298 0,11 251 0,06 175 3 
275 0,05 330 0,14 282 1 214 1 
284 0,06 340 0,17 293 2 227 2 
285 0,03 342 0,13 294 1 254 2 
301 1 349 0,15 300 1 256 2 
319 0,07 365 0,28 312 0,54 275 0,39 
335 0,07 365 0,28 314 0,33 282 0,39 
340 0,06 370 0,19 315 1 285 3 
342 0,10 387 0,28 334 1 286 1 
347 0,09 391 0,22 338 0,13 288 0,43 
349 0,11 395 0,24 344 1 314 1 
350 0,09 402 1 356 0,55 323 1 
358 0,07 405 0,39 356 1 324 3 
363 0,11 405 0,36 356 2 335 1 
364 0,14 411 0,27 360 1 347 1 
365 0,11 416 0,36 363 0,49 351 0,67 
370 0,13 417 0,45 363 3 352 0,54 
372 0,08 422 0,30 363 0,79 355 4 
377 0,05 423 0,38 365 0,80 356 1 
380 0,13 440 0,66 368 0,65 363 2 
395 0,12 441 0,29 370 1 364 2 
405 0,16 441 0,35 376 5 367 3 
406 0,11 442 1 378 0,57 376 1 
413 0,09 443 0,22 379 1 378 1 
421 0,12 449 0,29 395 0,48 382 2 
424 0,18 451 0,56 396 1 383 0,82 
427 0,14 452 0,44 398 0,71 388 1 
430 0,13 454 0,39 403 1 389 3 
438 0,23 454 0,32 407 0,90 389 3 
440 0,11 461 0,45 408 0,53 393 1 
 93 
 
441 0,13 461 0,33 408 0,65 393 3 
448 0,09 466 0,54 409 3 399 0,58 
449 0,13 472 0,43 414 0,36 409 1 
472 0,22 473 0,38 414 0,46 410 0,63 
482 0,19 477 0,65 421 0,90 417 1 
485 0,24 481 0,68 424 3 417 2 
502 0,14 487 0,98 431 2 419 0,93 
508 0,16 498 0,69 440 0,39 421 2 
508 0,23 505 0,38 443 0,52 422 1 
519 0,23 508 0,42 448 0,99 440 0,81 
522 0,33 508 0,29 459 1 444 1 
526 0,16 510 0,57 463 0,94 454 1 
594 0,34 522 1 475 1 461 1 
622 0,77 529 0,82 494 0,62 473 1 
622 0,58 533 0,93 496 0,54 477 0,93 
636 0,38 534 0,68 496 0,54 478 0,93 
655 0,49 550 0,94 496 0,54 519 0,97 
674 0,46 554 0,34 521 0,78 525 2 
680 0,79 589 0,86 531 1 572 1 
698 0,48 593 0,95 552 0,94 633 1 
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APPENDIX D: EVACUATION RESULTS IN BAR GRAPHS 
 
 
Figure 41 Effect of the design fire on the evacuation time 
 
Figure 42 Effect of the design fire on the average maximum FED 
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Figure 43 Effect of the design fire on the average fatalities 
 
Figure 44 Effect of the material set-up on the evacuation time 
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Figure 45 Effect of the material set-up on the average maximum FED 
 
Figure 46 Effect of the material set-up on the average fatalities 
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